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IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE 
ILAN WURMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  The standard formalist account of Article II’s Executive Vesting 
Clause is that “the executive power” refers to all the powers and 
authorities possessed by the executive magistrate in Great Britain prior 
to the Constitution’s adoption, subject to the assignment of such powers 
and authorities to the other departments of the national government. In 
recent papers, a handful of scholars have challenged this “residual 
vesting thesis” by amassing evidence that “the executive power” 
textually referred only to the power to carry law into execution and not 
to the bundle of other royal prerogatives—for example over foreign 
affairs and national security—enjoyed by the British monarch. 
According to the advocates of both accounts, the scope and nature of 
the executive is dramatically altered depending on which account one 
adopts.  
  This Article dissents from both views. “The executive power” was 
indeed about law execution and was not a residual grant of power; but 
both the Founding generation and its key guide, Blackstone, likely 
shared a “thick” understanding of this power. Their writings and 
statements suggest that “the executive power,” even in its narrower law-
execution sense, plausibly included the powers to appoint, remove, and 
direct executive officers and to promulgate regulations as necessary 
incidents to law execution. Not only is this account consistent with 
Blackstone and the historical meaning of “the executive power,” but it 
better fits the available data from the Constitutional Convention and 
early practice than either of the other two accounts. The residual vesting 
thesis requires us to believe that the Committee of Detail ignored the 
instructions of the delegates in the Constitutional Convention, to infer 
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that the delegates themselves were unaware of the implications of what 
they had written, and to ignore the fact that not a single opponent of the 
Constitution during ratification so much as mentioned the possibility 
of a residual grant. On the other hand, the law-execution thesis, at least 
a “thin” version of it, may not account for important practices and 
precedents. The “thick” view of “the executive power” advanced in this 
Article is the theory of best fit: it is the only one that fits the text, the 
Framers’ apparent intent, and the historical practice. The upshot of this 
approach is that the president probably has more power in the domestic 
sphere than under a thin law-execution account but less in foreign 
affairs than under the residual vesting thesis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Article I of the United States Constitution creates a national 
government of limited and enumerated legislative powers; it declares 
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.”1 Article II creates the executive 
branch, but its vesting clause is formulated differently: “The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”2 
The Article II Vesting Clause does not say only those executive powers 
“herein granted” shall be vested in the president; rather, it says “the 
executive power” shall be vested in the president.  
This distinct formulation has caused much controversy over the 
past 230 years because Article II nonetheless contains an enumeration 
of some kind. The first paragraph of Article II, Section 2 declares the 
president to be the commander in chief of the armed forces and grants 
the president the power to demand written opinions from the principal 
officers of the executive departments and to grant reprieves and 
pardons.3 The second paragraph of Section 2 gives the president and 
the Senate certain shared powers, namely to make treaties and 
appointments, although Congress may place responsibility for the 
appointment of inferior officers in the president alone, the heads of 
departments, or the courts.4  
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 2. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 3. The first clause states, in full: 
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of 
the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in 
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. 
Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
 4. The second clause states, in full: 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers 
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
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Article II, Section 3, then seems to involve the president’s duties 
and relationship to Congress. The president must from time to time 
give Congress information about the state of the union; may convene 
Congress on extraordinary occasions and may adjourn them in the 
event the House and Senate disagree about adjournment; and “shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission 
all the Officers of the United States.”5 This paragraph also gives the 
president the duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers.”6 
There are at least three ways to read the Executive Vesting Clause 
in light of this structure. The prevailing view among formalists may be 
termed the “residual vesting thesis.”7 According to this view, the 
vesting clause of Article II, unlike the parallel clause in Article I, vests 
all executive-type powers in the president, including those traditionally 
exercised by the British monarch. The subsequent enumeration in 
Article II—and elsewhere in the Constitution—is then largely a 
 
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment 
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
Id. § 2, cl. 2.  
 5. Section 3 contains only one clause: 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of 
them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of 
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall 
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. 
Id. § 3. 
 6. Id. I am indebted to Professor Michael W. McConnell for the insight about this structure. 
The first paragraph of Section 2 appears to include powers held by the president alone, which 
McConnell describes as prerogative power indefeasible by statute. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, 
THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING (forthcoming Nov. 2020) (manuscript at 207) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). The second paragraph of Section 2 appears to include 
prerogative powers the president shares with the Senate, id. (manuscript at 208), and the first 
paragraph of Section 3 appears to include power and duties the president has with respect to 
Congress and Congress’s laws, id. (manuscript at 210–11). McConnell thinks the clause respecting 
the commissioning of officers was left over from an earlier draft of the Constitution when 
Congress and the Senate had most of the appointment power. Id. (manuscript at 212).  
 7. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal 
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1185 (2019) [hereinafter Mortenson, Royal Prerogative] 
(explaining that “[a]mong constitutional originalists,” this thesis “remains dominant”); Julian 
Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 8) [hereinafter Mortenson, Executive Power Clause], https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3406350 [https://perma.cc/5NKB-8953] (describing this thesis as “easily the dominant 
historical account among modern commentators”). However, the cross-reference theory may be 
the predominant view in the academy and the judiciary. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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limitation on the president’s ability to exercise specific executive 
powers, or is perhaps a confirmation of them.8 Two proponents of this 
view, Professors Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey, explain it in 
the foreign-affairs context: 
[T]he President’s executive foreign affairs power is residual, 
encompassing . . . executive foreign affairs powers not allocated 
elsewhere by the Constitution’s text. The Constitution’s allocation of 
specific foreign affairs powers or roles to Congress or the Senate are 
properly read as assignments away from the President. Absent these 
specific allocations, by Article II, Section 1, all traditionally executive 
foreign affairs powers would be presidential.9 
Professor Michael W. McConnell, in a forthcoming monograph on 
executive power, also argues that the Executive Vesting Clause “vests 
all national powers of an executive nature in the President, except for 
[the] portion of the executive power that is vested elsewhere (mostly 
in Congress in Article I, Section 8), and except for the limitations and 
qualifications on the particular executive powers that are set forth in 
the text.”10 To name but some of these limitations and qualifications, 
 
 8. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 549 (2004) (explaining that the residual vesting thesis “reconciles 
the text of the Constitution with the breadth of presidential power by stipulating that the Article 
II Vesting Clause grants the President all powers that are in their nature ‘executive,’ subject only 
to the specific exceptions and qualifications set forth in the rest of the Constitution”). 
 9. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 
111 YALE L.J. 231, 253 (2001) (emphasis omitted). Justice Thomas, relying on Prakash and 
Ramsey, adheres to this view. He has written that the president may exercise “unenumerated 
foreign affairs powers” by virtue of the textual differences between the vesting clauses of Articles 
I and II. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice Thomas, “By 
omitting the words ‘herein granted’ in Article II, the Constitution indicates that the ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President is not confined to those powers expressly identified in the 
document. Instead, it includes all powers originally understood as falling within the ‘executive 
Power’ of the Federal Government.” Id. 
 10. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 185–90). For earlier statements of this view, 
see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 4 (4th rev. ed. 
1957) (raising the question that, “if there is ‘executive power’ that has been found essential in 
other systems of government and is not granted the President in the more specific clauses of 
Article II, how is it to be brought within the four corners of the Constitution except by means of 
the ‘executive power’ clause?”); id. at 10 (“[T]he blended picture of executive power derivable 
from the pages of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone is of a broadly discretionary residual 
power available when other governmental powers fail . . . .”); and id. at 14 (“[T]he Framers had 
in mind . . . the ‘balanced constitution’ of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, which carried 
with it the idea of a divided initiative in the matter of legislation and a broad range of autonomous 
executive power or ‘prerogative.’” (emphasis omitted)). Earlier still, Professor Thach argued that 
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Article I assigns a number of traditionally executive or prerogative 
powers to Congress, such as the powers to declare war, issue letters of 
marque, coin money, and regulate fleets and armies.11 On this reading, 
Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2 assigns some of this executive power, 
specifically over treaties and appointments, to the president and the 
Senate together. And Article II, Section 3 further limits executive 
power: Historically the king could prorogue Parliament,12 but the 
American president may only adjourn Congress in the event of a 
disagreement between the two houses. Further, the president has a 
duty to execute Congress’s laws faithfully, by which the Framers may 
have meant the president could not suspend the laws or dispense with 
them on particular occasions.13 
The second possible reading of the Executive Vesting Clause is 
what Professor Julian Davis Mortenson calls the “Law Execution” 
reading.14 Mortenson maintains that “the executive power” refers only 
to one specific power: the power to execute the laws. All of the powers 
that are considered “executive” according to the residual vesting thesis 
were in fact historically considered to be “prerogative” rather than 
“executive” powers, and “the executive power” was but one of these 
 
where, by the terms of the Constitution, the national government is vested with control 
over a certain sphere of action, that portion of the field is the President’s which is 
executive in character. Thus the Constitution makes the national government the sole 
organ for the conduct of foreign affairs. And yet the powers which are necessary for it 
to take this duty upon it are not all conferred by the Constitution—the power to 
recognize new governments or new States, to dismiss foreign ministers, even to conduct 
general negotiations. Since they are not enumerated, they are the President’s as of 
constitutional right, being of an executive character. 
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 165 (1923). 
 11. See infra notes 100–29 and accompanying text for an account of these powers in the 
Constitution and in William Blackstone’s commentaries.  
 12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 180 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765) (“[A]s the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so also it is 
a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for 
a time, or put a final period to it’s existence.”). A quick note of grammar: Blackstone and other 
eighteenth-century writers used the contraction “it’s” as possessive. The Oxford English 
Dictionary has several examples of this usage between 1611 and 1802. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 150–51 (2d ed. 1989). 
 13. Although there is no “smoking gun” evidence, it is commonly assumed that by faithful 
execution the Framers meant to invoke the prohibitions on the suspending and dispensing powers 
announced in the Bill of Rights of 1689. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 92–96, 95 
n.339) (describing this “consensus” view). 
 14. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1180; Mortenson, Executive Power 
Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6). 
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prerogatives.15 This definition of “prerogative” is contrary to 
McConnell’s definition, which depends on John Locke’s view of 
“prerogative” as executive discretion to act contrary to law.16 Here, 
Mortenson seems to have the upper hand because Blackstone used 
“prerogative” to refer to power generally and not to the specific power 
to act without law,17 and it is Blackstone’s definition of prerogative that 
appears to have been widely shared in pre- and post-revolutionary 
America.18 Mortenson’s view is also consistent with the routine use of 
the term “prerogatives” in the Constitutional Convention to mean 
 
 15. Mortenson argues that the “suite of substantive authorities” that Blackstone described 
“had a name: ‘The King’s Prerogative.’” Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1223 
(quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 230). The first of these royal authorities was “the 
‘supreme executive power,’ specifically defined as ‘the right of enforcing the laws.’” Id. (quoting 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 142–43, 183). “The royal prerogative, as it was understood in the 
Founding Era,” Mortenson writes, “comprised a long list of separate and highly particularized 
legal authorities within a well-understood framework of English constitutional law” with no 
particular “overarching theoretical coherence.” Id. at 1228. “‘The prerogative’ [was] the basket 
category for royal power and ‘the executive power’ [was] one specific authority among a great 
many in that basket.” Id. at 1229. “[E]xecutive power” in the context of state action was “the 
implementing power: the authority to deploy the massed force of the state to bring legislated 
intentions into effect, especially the laws and their intended consequences.” Id. at 1237. 
 16. McConnell defines prerogative as “powers the executive could exercise . . . without need 
for legislative authorization and beyond legislative control.” MCCONNELL, supra note 6 
(manuscript at 5). Hence, he argues that “[r]esidual executive powers are not prerogative powers: 
they may be exercised by the President without advance congressional authorization, but they are 
subordinate to exercises of Congress’s enumerated powers.” Id. (manuscript at 203). This 
definition, as explained, is taken from John Locke, who wrote that because the lawmaking body 
is “too numerous,” “slow,” and “not always in being, . . . and because also it is impossible to 
foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the 
publick,” there is therefore “a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice, 
which the Laws do not prescribe.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 393 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). The prerogative power, in other words, “can be 
nothing, but the Peoples permitting their Rulers, to do several things of their own free choice, 
where the Law was silent, and sometimes [this power can go] against the direct Letter of the Law, 
for the publick good.” Id. at 395. 
 17. Blackstone defined the prerogative as “those rights and capacities which the king enjoys 
alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his 
subjects.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 232. “The executive power” is precisely such a power 
which the king alone enjoyed, that power being “vested by our laws in a single person, the king 
or queen.” Id. at 183. Elsewhere, Blackstone described the prerogative as the king’s “authority” 
or “power,” id. at 249, which would again include “the executive power.” 
 18. Matthew Steilen, How To Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early 
American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557 passim (2018). Professor Matthew Steilen argues that 
there are multiple meanings of “prerogative,” and that Locke’s was not widely shared in America. 
Id. at 641. Additionally, each of the main usages of the term in America can be subsumed under 
the term “power,” including, for example, the king’s prerogative to charter colonies, the colonies’ 
prerogative (delegated from the king) of self-government, and the like. Id. at 585 & n.84. 
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federal as opposed to state power.19 If the Founders shared this 
understanding of “prerogative,” then, as Mortenson argues, the 
president only has those few prerogative powers expressly granted by 
the Constitution. “The executive power” is one such power. Others 
include the president’s power to be commander in chief, to receive 
ambassadors, to make treaties and appointments with senatorial advice 
and consent, to grant reprieves and pardons, and to adjourn the houses 
of Congress or call them into session on extraordinary occasions.  
Professors John Harrison and Matthew Steilen agree with 
Mortenson’s reading of the Executive Vesting Clause. Harrison 
describes “the executive power” as the legal capacity “to occupy the 
characteristic positions of executive officials in a legal environment of 
rules that empower and constrain those officials.”20 “[T]his account of 
the Article II executive power,” Harrison summarizes, “rejects the 
possibility that it includes any of the British royal prerogative, except 
to the extent that the prerogative included the authority to carry out 
the law and administer the government, subject to any applicable 
statutes.”21 And Steilen, writing a year before Mortenson and 
Harrison, examined early-American usage of the term “prerogative” 
 
 19. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand 
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (“Mr. Pinkney [sic] . . . urged . . . that if the 
States were left to act of themselves in any case, it wd. be impossible to defend the national 
prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper.”); id. at 165 (reporting that James 
Madison observed during discussions of a negative on state legislation that “[t]his prerogative of 
the General Govt. is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of 
the States”); id. at 317 (recording Madison’s critiques of a plan for “omitting a controul over the 
States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives”). James Wilson observed that 
[t]he natil. Govt. is one & yt. of the states another — Commerce, War, Peace, Treaties, 
&c are peculiar to the former — certain inferior and local Qualities are the province of 
the Latter — there is a line of separation; where ever the prerogatives lie[] on the side 
of the Genl. Govt. we are citizens of the nation or of the US. 
Id. at 416; see also id. at 447 (noting Madison’s description of taxation as “the highest prerogative 
of supremacy”).  
 20. John Harrison, Executive Power 3 (June 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398427 [https://perma.cc/CXS2-J8MP]. 
 21. Id. at 26. Professor John Harrison suggests that this vision of the executive was based on 
the “Whig theory of executive power.” Id. at 30 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective 
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993)); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, The Old 
Whig Theory of the Executive Power, NEW REFORM CLUB (Jan. 18, 2019, 5:02 AM), 
https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-old-whig-theory-of-executive-power.html [https://
perma.cc/J8NT-4LB9] (“The Executive Power of Article II is wholly an excrescence of Congress’ 
[power to make statutes] . . . . The Old Whig theory stands in opposition to the Hamiltonian 
theory of a core or residuum of undefined executive power which exists absent an express grant 
of Article I, Section 7 authority from Congress.”).  
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and argues that American writers distinguished that term from “the 
executive power,” which was the power only to execute law.22 
Third, the “cross-reference” reading maintains that the Executive 
Vesting Clause simply establishes who is to exercise “the executive 
power,” but the only such powers the president actually has are given 
in other parts of Article II. Thus, the president, like Congress, has only 
those powers specifically enumerated. Justice Jackson, in his 
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,23 adhered to 
this view.24 Perhaps as a result of Justice Jackson’s adherence, the 
cross-reference theory is probably still the dominant theory among 
nonoriginalists.25 For purposes of this Article, however, there are two 
reasons to put the cross-reference theory aside. First, it is the least 
plausible of the accounts, at least on originalist grounds. If the clause 
merely identifies who is to exercise the subsequently granted powers, 
then the Take Care Clause must be a grant of power to execute the 
laws. Perhaps so, but it is framed as a duty and not a power.26 Moreover, 
the parallel clause in Article III must be a grant of substantive power 
 
 22. See Steilen, supra note 18, at 563, 642. Professors Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty 
noted this possibility in 2004:  
It is possible . . . that the phrase “executive Power” confers simply a power to execute 
the laws. That would help explain, for example, why it is written in the singular rather 
than the plural. Indeed, to the extent that there are any Founding statements ascribing 
substantive content to the Article II Vesting Clause, they are all statements equating 
executive power with the power to execute the laws. 
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 553.  
 23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 24. Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant 
in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office 
of the generic powers thereafter stated.”).  
 25. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 554 (“[A] significant issue during the drafting of 
the Constitution was whether to have a unitary or plural executive. The Article II Vesting Clause 
may simply make clear where the executive power is being vested — in a unitary President — not 
the scope of that power.”); id. at 554 n.29 (“The records of the Constitutional Convention make 
it clear that the purposes of [the Article II Vesting Clause] were simply to settle the question 
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the executive a title.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Edward S. Corwin, Comment, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial 
Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 53 (1953))); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 n.195 (1994) (“[T]he [Article II] 
Vesting Clause does nothing more than show who . . . is to exercise the executive power, and not 
what that power is.”). This position was even articulated by at least one representative in the great 
1789 debate over removal. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 466 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement 
of Rep. White) (“[T]he Executive powers so vested, are those enumerated in the Constitution.”); 
see infra Part III.A.  
 26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). Indeed, Blackstone explained that the “principal duty of the king is, to govern 
his people according to law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 226 (emphasis added). 
WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  3:13 PM 
102  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:93 
to judges, otherwise nothing in Article III allows judges to exercise any 
power.27 Second, if the Take Care Clause is a grant of law-execution 
power, then in any event the law-execution and cross-reference 
theories will have similar implications, with the admittedly important 
exceptions of presidential removal and administrative control.28  
Focusing, then, on the two main contenders—the residual vesting 
and law-execution readings—each has critical shortcomings. The 
proponents of the residual vesting thesis argue that a plethora of 
foreign affairs related powers, such as instructing and recalling 
ambassadors, communicating with foreign governments, setting U.S. 
foreign policy, entering into executive agreements, and terminating 
treaties, seem “inexplicable” and may have “no defensible explanation 
of how they fit into the Constitution’s text” without a residual vesting 
of executive powers.29 Thus, the law-execution account seems difficult 
to square with at least some historical practice.30 And putting aside 
 
 27. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1992) (arguing that Article III’s 
Vesting Clause is the “only explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary’s authority to 
act”). 
 28. Professor McConnell, for example, argues that “the executive power” is entirely 
defeasible by statute, and therefore an indefeasible removal power follows from the Take Care 
Clause but not the Executive Vesting Clause. See MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 206). 
On the reading advanced here, however, “the executive power” is indefeasible. See infra Part III. 
Even so, the scope of the removal power may very well differ based on whether it stems from one 
or the other clause. The Take Care Clause, for example, may be satisfied by for-cause removal 
provisions. So long as a subordinate officer is exercising discretion consistently with law, there 
would be no grounds for removal, and no Take Care violation. But if the removal power comes 
from the Executive Vesting Clause, then the president may direct how a subordinate exercises 
discretion.  
 29. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 243–52.  
 30. McConnell writes: “If the President were limited to the enumerated powers in Sections 
2 and 3,” then “every president from Washington through Obama and Trump would have been 
exceeding his proper powers, and flagrantly so.” MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 186). 
McConnell argues that Article II “fail[s] to address some powers of immense importance, such as 
the power to direct foreign policy,” and among these are “entering international agreements, 
supporting or opposing foreign insurrections, forming or breaking alliances, voting in bodies like 
the United Nations, recognizing foreign regimes, locating embassies, [and] abrogating treaties.” 
Id. (manuscript at 10–11). “The gap in domestic matters is less glaring but also concerning,” he 
writes: “The President has express authority to demand the opinions of his officers, but no express 
authority to give them guidance or commands. That must be an ‘executive’ power, but it is not 
enumerated.” Id. He says later in his monograph that interpreting the other grants of power in 
Article II as conferring the panoply of foreign affairs functions exercised by the president “would 
entail such a latitude of construction as to make the limiting language of the Constitution 
illusory.” Id. (manuscript at 189). Other foreign affairs scholars agree that many foreign affairs 
powers seem extra-constitutional or missing, even if those scholars do not agree with the residual 
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foreign policy,31 the law-execution reading does not account for 
broader presidential power in the domestic sphere, such as a 
presidential removal power, which many in the Founding generation 
seem to have believed was included within “the executive power.”32 
Yet the advocates of the residual vesting thesis ignore at least two 
inconvenient, and critical, facts. First, understanding the grant of “the 
executive power” to be a residual grant of prerogative powers requires 
believing that the Committee of Detail that composed the initial draft 
of the Constitution ignored the instructions of the Convention, which 
had voted to give the national executive only the authority to execute 
the laws and to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for.33 Second, 
it requires ignoring that not a single opponent of ratification so much 
as mentioned the possibility of a residual grant, even among those who 
feared the scope of powers conferred upon the national executive.34 
And to these inconvenient facts this Article adds a third and fourth: the 
Convention’s debate over the power to erect corporations and the 
delegates’ likely views on immigration suggest none of the delegates 
themselves perceived that the Executive Vesting Clause would confer 
a residuum of prerogative powers.35 
This Article takes a fresh look at debates over “the executive 
power” in light of recent scholarship and offers a new account, one that 
better fits the text, the intent of the Framers, and the historical practice. 
“The executive power” did, indeed, seem to refer only to the power of 
law execution, but there is a thin version of this executive power and a 
thicker version. The former consists in only the power to carry into 
execution Congress’s laws with the precise tools, officers, and 
prescriptions Congress itself chooses. In contrast, the latter plausibly 
 
vesting thesis. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 13–15 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that many government foreign affairs powers are 
“not mentioned” by and are “missing” from the Constitution and noting myriad examples). 
 31. Indeed, it may be that some exercises of presidential foreign affairs authority simply are 
unconstitutional; it is odd that the proponents of the residual vesting thesis rarely consider that 
possibility. 
 32. See infra Part III.A. 
 33. For the drafting history, see infra Part II.C. Regarding the Committee of Detail, 
McConnell writes that although the Convention gave the president “only the powers of law 
execution and appointment to offices other than judges, soon to be augmented by a qualified 
veto,” the Committee of Detail “reinstated a vesting clause at least as broad as the original” 
resolution granting general executive rights and powers. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript 
at 56). 
 34. See MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 75). 
 35. For this novel argument, see infra Part II.B. 
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includes the power to issue regulations and to appoint, remove, and 
direct executive officers in furtherance of law execution. This Article 
shows that the thick law-execution understanding of “the executive 
power” is consistent with Blackstone, with the work of the 
Constitutional Convention, and with Founding-era debates and other 
historical practice. Indeed, it is the only available theory that truly 
seems to fit. It therefore represents the most probable meaning of the 
Executive Vesting Clause.36  
To make the case, Part I surveys the textual evidence already laid 
out by other scholars. It seeks to show, without reinventing the wheel, 
that this textual evidence favors the law-execution reading, although it 
is not entirely unambiguous. It then looks specifically at Blackstone’s 
use of “the executive power,” given Blackstone’s apparent influence 
on the constitutional drafters.37  
 
 36. Originalists look to text, structure, intent, and early historical practice to ascertain the 
likely original meaning, or the range of plausible meanings, of a particular constitutional 
provision. See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ORIGINALISM 18–20 (2017) (arguing that intent is evidence of textual meaning); William Baude, 
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019) (articulating a theory uniting 
originalism and historical practice); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 
NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1298–1301 (2019) (noting a variety of structural arguments made by 
originalists). Of course, it could be that early practice was simply inconsistent with text, or the 
text with the intent, and so on. In other words, these interpretive tools do not always have to align 
for us to know the original meaning of a particular provision. But the more those tools do align, 
the more likely the interpretation is to be correct.  
 37. McConnell describes Blackstone’s influence: 
A principal conclusion is that the framers self-consciously analyzed each of the 
prerogative powers of the British monarch as listed in Blackstone’s Commentaries, but 
did not vest all (or even most) of them in the American executive. Instead, some were 
vested in Congress, some were vested in the President, and some where [sic] denied to 
the national government altogether.  
MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 12). McConnell further notes that “William Winslow 
Crosskey of the University of Chicago was the first to note that the enumeration of powers by the 
Committee of Detail was as much about legislative-executive separation of powers as it was about 
federalism.” Id. (manuscript at 56) (first citing 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 428–29 (1953); then citing GERHARD 
CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 21 (1997)). For Blackstone’s 
general influence, see Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1220 & n.189 (“But for 
Americans like James Madison, Blackstone’s treatise was the ‘book which is in every man’s 
hand’—central to pedagogy, drafting, and litigation alike as the standard restatement of the 
formal constitutional law of England.” (quoting Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 18, 
1788) (statement of James Madison), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1371, 1382 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993))) and id. 
at 1221 n.189 (“[T]he honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the Student’s Hornbook, [and] 
from that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide into toryism, and 
nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue.” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: POLITICAL 
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Part II turns to the structure of the Constitution itself as it emerged 
from the Constitutional Convention, and to the debates that occurred 
there and after. Part II.A suggests—as has been suggested before38—
that the Framers’ key guide on executive power was likely Blackstone. 
Almost every single power Blackstone listed as belonging to the British 
monarch the U.S. Constitution assigns to some department of the 
national government. Part II.B then argues that the omission of certain 
prerogative powers—those over the erection of corporations and over 
immigration—is particularly telling. This Article, for the first time in 
the scholarship, analyzes these omissions and their implications for the 
residual vesting thesis. The omissions suggest that the delegates did not 
understand the Executive Vesting Clause to be a residual grant of 
power. Part II.C briefly addresses two other known historical points: 
the Convention’s instruction to the Committee of Detail, and the 
absence of any evidence for the residual vesting thesis in the 
Ratification debates. Finally, Part II.D argues that the law-execution 
account makes the most sense of the variations in the three vesting 
clauses. Putting these data together, Part II makes a comprehensive 
argument for the law-execution reading of the Executive Vesting 
Clause.  
Parts III and IV turn to historical practice and post-Ratification 
separation of powers debates. Part III examines domestic separation 
of powers debates and argues that a “thick” law-execution reading of 
the Executive Vesting Clause has significant explanatory power for the 
debates involving appointments, removals, prosecutorial power, 
administrative regulations, and seizing steel mills. For example, this 
Part shows that Blackstone understood the prerogative power to issue 
proclamations as to the “manner, time, and circumstances of putting 
[the] laws in execution”39 to be part of “the executive power of the 
laws.” Once this is understood, the real issue in Youngstown was not 
whether the president had some “emergency” or “inherent” power to 
seize the steel mills; the debate was rather over whether the president’s 
action was actually in execution of Congress’s various laws or was an 
act of new lawmaking. In other words, it was a debate over whether or 
 
WRITINGS 57, 58 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 2004))). But see Martin Jordan Minot, 
Note, The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking the Eighteenth-Century Importance of the 
Commentaries, 104 VA. L. REV. 1359, 1362–63 (2018) (arguing that other thinkers dominated 
legal education and early American understandings of the common law). The present Article 
confirms Blackstone’s crucial influence on the overall structure of the Constitution.  
 38. See supra note 37. 
 39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261. 
WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  3:13 PM 
106  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:93 
not the president was properly exercising a “proclamation” power to 
help carry into execution the existing laws. Justice Jackson’s famous 
concurrence was a distraction from the case’s true controversy. 
Part IV argues that many foreign affairs powers can also be 
fruitfully analyzed under this thick understanding of “the executive 
power,” particularly the powers to declare neutrality, terminate 
treaties, instruct and recall ambassadors, set foreign policy, recognize 
foreign governments, and enter into executive agreements. Here, 
however, although the thick understanding explains some of these 
presidential powers, others it cannot explain—at least not as 
exclusively presidential powers.40 The upshot of all this is that the 
president probably has more power in the domestic sphere than under 
a thin law-execution reading, but likely less in foreign affairs than 
under a residual grant. 
If this is right, then the implications of the various theories can be 
represented as follows, where the leftmost column represents the 
question of whether the president has that particular power: 
 
 
 40. For example, it is not even clear that the ability to “set” foreign policy is a “power” in 
the constitutional sense. Anyone can talk—whether the president (or anyone else) has the 
authority to make good on that talk is another matter entirely. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
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 Residual 
Vesting 
Thin Law-
Execution 
Thick Law-
Execution 
Cross 
Reference 
Removal Yes Congressional 
discretion 
Yes Only for 
faithless 
execution 
Prosecutorial 
Control 
Yes Congressional 
discretion 
Yes Only for 
faithless 
execution 
Seizing Steel 
Mills 
No No No No 
Neutrality 
Proclamation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treaty 
Termination 
Yes Congressional 
discretion 
Sometimes Sometimes 
Instructing & 
Recalling 
Ambassadors 
Yes Congressional 
discretion 
Yes Yes 
Setting Foreign 
Policy 
Yes No No No 
Recognition Exclusive Nonexclusive Nonexclusive Nonexclusive 
Torture Not without 
congressional 
authorization 
Not without 
congressional 
authorization 
Not without 
congressional 
authorization 
Not without 
congressional 
authorization 
Binding 
Executive 
Agreements 
Yes Congressional 
delegation 
Congressional 
delegation 
Congressional 
delegation 
 
I.  THE TEXTUAL MEANING OF “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” 
The textual evidence for the meaning of “the executive power” 
over which scholars have argued is mixed, although the law-execution 
reading is the better reading. Part I.A predominantly examines 
evidence from political thinkers who were influential on the Founders, 
from state constitutions, and from Alexander Hamilton. Part I.B 
specifically addresses Blackstone’s view of executive power.  
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A. Competing Textual Evidence  
1. Influential Political Thinkers.  John Locke’s Second Treatise on 
Government was deeply influential on the Founding generation.41 
Locke describes an “executive power” in the domestic sphere and a 
“federative power” in the foreign affairs space. After discussing the 
legislative power, Locke writes that because the laws “need a perpetual 
Execution, . . . [it is] necessary there should be a Power always in being, 
which should see to the Execution of the Laws that are made, and 
remain in force. And thus the Legislative and Executive Power come 
often to be separated.”42 Here, “the executive power” is defined as “the 
execution of the laws that are made.” Locke then writes that there is 
“another” power involving the relations between members of one 
political community and those of another; “[t]his therefore contains the 
Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the 
Transactions, with all Persons and Communities without the 
Commonwealth, and may be called Federative, if any one pleases.”43 
Locke explains that although “[t]hese two Powers, Executive and 
Federative,” are “really distinct in themselves, . . . they are always 
almost united” in a single person because both require “the force of 
the Society for their exercise.”44 Professors Prakash and Ramsey write 
of Locke’s discussion that “[a]lthough the powers were distinct as a 
theoretical matter, Locke could cite the powers interchangeably, 
because he had stated that they were inseparable.”45 Yet Locke is not 
a sure guide on this score. Some of the specific powers that Locke 
describes as federative—war and peace and leagues and alliances—
were distinctly given to Congress or the Senate in coordination with 
the president. The Framers rejected Locke’s very proposition that 
these powers are “always almost united” in a single magistrate; 
 
 41. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27–
30 (enlarged ed. 1992) (describing John Locke’s influence on Founding-generation Americans); 
ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING 13–21 (2006) (describing the prominent 
twentieth-century interpretation of the Founding “that the core of the Founders’ political thought 
is encapsulated in the Lockean variation of the principles of classical liberalism”); Jack N. 
Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1598 (1997) (“There is 
no question that politically articulate eighteenth-century Americans—and certainly members of 
the political elite—were eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like Hobbes, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone.”).  
 42. LOCKE, supra note 16, at 382–83. 
 43. Id. at 383 (emphasis omitted).  
 44. Id. at 383–84 (emphasis omitted). 
 45. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 268. 
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decisions to go to war and to enter into treaties require just as much 
policymaking, if not more policymaking, than they require the 
application of any force. Hence James Wilson in the Constitutional 
Convention observed that “the great qualities in the several parts of 
the Executive are vigor and dispatch,” but “[m]aking peace and war 
are generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be 
legislative powers.”46 
Instead of treating Locke’s executive and federative powers as 
united in a single person, then, the Framers appear to have maintained 
the distinction and assigned the bundle of federative powers away from 
the chief magistrate. Or, as Professor Harrison puts it, “The strongest 
indication that the Constitution does not employ Locke’s typology is 
that it vests three powers, [the legislative, executive, and judicial,] not 
four.”47 It excludes the federative power. 
Montesquieu was also deeply influential on the Framers.48 In 
Montesquieu’s famous treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, he calls the 
federative power a type of “executive” power: “In each state there are 
three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive power over the 
things depending on the right of nations, and executive power over the 
things depending on civil right.”49 By the second of these powers the 
magistrate “makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, 
establishes security, and prevents invasions,” and by the third “he 
punishes crimes or judges disputes between individuals.”50 
 
 46. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 73–74. Professor McConnell suspects that William Pierce, 
who reported this remark from Wilson, may have misheard Wilson. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 
(manuscript at 33). That seems unlikely. According to Madison,  
Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility 
to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper 
guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a 
Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace [etc.]. The only powers he 
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, 
not ⟨appertaining to and⟩ appointed by the Legislature. 
FARRAND, supra note 19, at 65–66. McConnell believes that “among others” refers to powers not 
legislative in nature, MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 33), but it seems more natural to 
read it as saying “among other examples of legislative powers, that of war & peace [etc.].” This 
would be consistent with Pierce’s note. 
 47. Harrison, supra note 20, at 24; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 560 (arguing 
that Locke “distinguishes executive power from foreign relations power”). 
 48. BAILYN, supra note 41, at 27–30; Rakove, supra note 41, at 1598.  
 49. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller 
& Harold Samuel Stone eds., 1989) (1748). 
 50. Id. at 156–57. 
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Montesquieu therefore calls this last power “the power of judging,” 
and the other “the executive power of the state.”51  
This is evidence in favor of the residual vesting thesis, but just as 
with Locke, one cannot put too much emphasis on it. It appears that 
only Thomas Rutherforth employed a similar taxonomy, calling 
Locke’s federative power the “executive power” and Locke’s 
“executive power” a “power of judging.”52 Instead, the Framers clearly 
separated the execution of the laws from the power to judge, lodging 
the former in the national executive and the latter in the courts, 
suggesting that they rejected Montesquieu’s taxonomy. Moreover, 
Professor Mortenson claims that this passage from Montesquieu was 
never cited in the Convention or ratification debates.53  
Yet, as Mortenson recognizes, the famous Essex Result, by which 
several Massachusetts towns expressed their disapproval of a proposed 
state constitution, did use Montesquieu’s taxonomy54:  
The executive power is sometimes divided into the external executive, 
and internal executive. The former comprehends war, peace, the 
sending and receiving ambassadors, and whatever concerns the 
transactions of the state with any other independent state. The 
confederation of the United States of America hath lopped off this 
branch of the executive, and placed it in Congress. We have therefore 
only to consider the internal executive power, which is employed in 
the peace, security and protection of the subject and his property, and 
in the defence of the state. The executive power is to marshal and 
command her militia and armies for her defence, to enforce the law, 
and to carry into execution all the orders of the legislative powers.55  
 
 51. Id. at 157. 
 52. Rutherforth casts the judiciary in terms of its underlying executive nature: 
The second branch of executive power, which is called external executive power, . . . is 
the power of acting with the common strength or jo[i]nt force of the society to guard 
against such injuries, as threaten it from without; to obtain amends for the damages 
arising from such injuries; or to inflict punishment upon the authors and abettors of 
them. 
2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 54 (Cambridge, J. Bentham 1756). 
Mortenson writes that Rutherforth was the only writer to adopt this idiosyncratic view of the 
taxonomy of internal and external executive power. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, 
at 1251.  
 53. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1259.  
 54. Id. at 1250 n.347. 
 55. RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HOLDEN AT IPSWICH IN THE COUNTY OF 
ESSEX, WHO WERE DEPUTED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CONSTITUTION AND FORM 
OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 
(Newbury-Port, John Mycall 1778), reprinted in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
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Even though this document may not have had much impact outside of 
Massachusetts at the time, and it predated the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution by about a decade, it still suggests that Montesquieu was 
on the bookshelf of educated Americans of the period. 
Another influential writer was Jean de Lolme, who published the 
final edition of his work, The Constitution of England, in 1784.56 De 
Lolme writes that when Parliament ceases to exist, “its laws still 
continue to be in force: the King remains charged with the execution 
of them, and is supplied with the necessary power for that purpose.”57 
He then adds that the king was “the representative, and the depositary, 
of all the power and collective majesty of the Nation; he sends and 
receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the prerogative 
of declaring war, and of making peace, on whatever conditions he 
thinks proper.”58 In the beginning of the very next chapter, de Lolme 
states that “[t]he King not only unites in himself all the branches of the 
Executive power,—he not only disposes, without controul, of the 
whole military power in the State,—but he is moreover, it seems, 
Master of the Law itself,” as he can dismiss Parliament.59 In this last 
passage, de Lolme could be describing all of these powers as “branches 
of the Executive power,” including the power over the military. Or he 
could be saying that the king unites in himself all branches of “the 
executive power,” and also controls the military and the legislative 
power of the state. On this reading, the control of the military is distinct 
from “all the branches of the Executive power.” This reading seems 
more plausible because “the executive power” would include more 
than simply military control, suggesting that de Lolme’s reference to 
military control was not an appositive referencing back to “the 
executive power,” but rather was mentioned in that passage as an 
independent power. 
The meaning of “the executive power” is therefore not 
unequivocal. In Locke, the executive and federative powers are 
 
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 324, 337 (Oscar 
Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966). 
 56. See JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL 
IMAGINATION 197–98 (1992) (describing how John Adams took “closely copied” notes from de 
Lolme’s 1784 revisions); BAILYN, supra note 41, at 27 (noting de Lolme’s broader influence). 
 57. J.L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (London, G. 
Robinson & J. Murray 4th ed. 1784); see also Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1231 
n.267.  
 58. DE LOLME, supra note 57, at 73.  
 59. Id. at 74.  
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distinct; in Montesquieu there are distinct “executive” powers to 
administer law, which he redefines as the power of judging, and to 
conduct foreign policy; and in de Lolme it is not entirely clear if “the 
executive power” includes other prerogative powers, or is simply a 
power to execute law.  
Mortenson, however, quite exhaustively goes through other 
sources, particularly those from the seventeenth century.60 In these 
sources, the term “the executive power,” when used in the singular and 
not to refer to the institution of the executive, almost always (perhaps 
always) referred to the power to carry laws into execution. For 
example, in 1698, political theorist Algernon Sidney wrote, “The 
Sword of Justice comprehends the legislative and the executive Power: 
the one is exercised in making Laws, the other in judging Controversies 
according to such as are made.”61 Here, although executive and judicial 
functions are not yet separated, the implication is that the legislative 
power makes the laws while “the executive power” carries them into 
execution. James Harrington similarly wrote, “[T]he hand of the 
magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head of the 
magistrate is answerable unto the people that his execution be 
according unto the law; . . . the hand or sword that executeth the law is 
in it, and not above it.”62 Robert Filmer wrote, “By these words of 
legislative, nomothetical and architectonical power, in plain English, [is 
understood] a power of making laws. And by gubernative and 
executive, a power of putting those laws in execution by judging and 
punishing offenders.”63 
Emer de Vattel, a continental author, wrote, “The executive 
power naturally belongs to the sovereign,—to every conductor of a 
people: he is supposed to be invested with it, in its fullest extent, when 
the fundamental laws do not restrict it. When the laws are established, 
it is the prince’s province to have them put in execution.”64 And then, 
of course, there is Jean-Jacques Rousseau:  
 
 60. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1230–43. For a selection of the sources 
uncovered by Mortenson, see infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 61. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 295 (London 1698).  
 62. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA 15 (London 1656), as 
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155, 174 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1977).  
 63. ROBERT FILMER, THE ANARCHY OF A LIMITED OR MIXED MONARCHY 4 (London 
1648), as reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 131, 136 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).  
 64. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162, at 187 (Béla Kapossy & 
Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797).  
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When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should 
resolve to go that way and secondly that my feet should carry 
me. . . . The body politic has the same two motive powers – and we 
can make the same distinction between will and strength, the former 
is legislative power and the latter executive power.65 
These statements, and the others that Mortenson uncovers,66 are 
quite persuasive. They suggest that “the executive power” represented 
“force,” but the legislative power, which represented “will,” had to 
direct that force.67 This is also consistent with some Founding-era 
statements, such as those of Hamilton writing as Pacificus, describing 
“the executive power” “as that Power which is charged with the 
command and application of the Public Force.”68 This implies some 
prior direction from some other authority, with the exception perhaps 
of repelling invasion.  
In summary, most uses of the term “the executive power” were 
references to law execution. A small handful of eighteenth-century 
writers, however, such as Montesquieu and the authors of the Essex 
Result, plausibly included Locke’s federative power within “the 
executive power.” 
2. State Constitutions and “Executive Powers.”  State constitutions 
also reveal ambiguity about the meaning of “the executive power.” 
Professor Harrison relies in particular on the constitutions of Virginia 
 
 65. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. III, ch. I, at 101 (Maurice 
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762).  
 66. Mortenson also argues that the executive power was entirely controllable by the 
legislative power; this is further evidence that “the executive power” was nothing more than the 
power to execute law. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 62–69). 
For example, “A Farmer” wrote during the ratification debates that “[t]he power of making rules 
or laws to govern or protect the society is the essence of sovereignty, for by this the executive and 
judicial powers are directed and controuled, to this every ministerial agent is subservient.” A 
Farmer, The Fallacies of the Freeman detected by a Farmer, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 16 & 23, 
1788, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 133, 134 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995). And a generation 
later, Charles Francis Adams wrote, “This legislative power is then the precise measure of the 
executive power.” CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, AN APPEAL FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD WHIGS 
15 (Bos., Russell, Odiorne & Co. 1835). 
 67. Professor Philip Hamburger has suggested to me that the tripartite separation of powers 
goes farther back to the medieval separation among force, will, and judgment. That seems 
plausible and consistent with the above quotations, and it would be further support for my thesis: 
there can be no force without will. The residual vesting thesis maintains, on the other hand, that 
sometimes the executive may exercise force without any indication of congressional will. 
 68. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS 
DEBATES OF 1793-1794, at 8, 11 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) [hereinafter PACIFICUS].  
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and Maryland from 1776 for his claim that the Founding generation 
likely shared the narrow, Whig conception of “the executive power.”69 
Both constitutions granted the state governors the “executive powers 
of government” but only “according to the laws,” and then prohibited 
the exercise of “any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute 
or custom of England,” with some enumerated exceptions.70 This 
suggests that even when the Founding generation used the term 
“executive powers” in the plural, such powers could still only be 
exercised “according to the laws”; that is, such powers, even if they 
went beyond law execution, were defeasible and controllable by the 
legislature.  
Some state constitutions used the term “executive powers” in the 
plural but did not expressly forbid the exercise of prerogative powers. 
Even in these constitutions, the “executive powers” were to be 
exercised according to the laws. The Delaware Constitution of 1776 
declared that the president of the state had the power to lay embargoes, 
grant reprieves and pardons, and “may exercise all the other executive 
powers of government, limited and restrained as by this constitution is 
mentioned, and according to the laws of the State.”71 Listing out 
embargoes and pardons and then declaring that the president “may 
exercise all the other executive powers of government” suggests that 
the royal prerogative powers were here described as “executive.” On 
 
 69. Harrison, supra note 20, at 29–30. 
 70. Under the Virginia Constitution, the governor 
shall, with the advice of a Council of State, exercise the executive powers of 
government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth; and shall not, under any 
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of 
England. But he shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have the power of 
granting reprieves or pardons, except where the prosecution shall have been carried on 
by the House of Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which cases, 
no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of the House of Delegates. 
VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3816–17 
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]. As provided in the 
corresponding clause of the Maryland Constitution,  
the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Council, may embody the 
militia; and, when embodied, shall alone have the direction thereof; and shall also have 
the direction of all the regular land and sea forces, under the laws of this State . . . ; and 
may alone exercise all other the executive powers of government, where the concurrence 
of the Council is not required, according to the laws of this State; and grant reprieves or 
pardons for any crime, except in such cases where the law shall otherwise direct; and 
may, during the recess of the General Assembly, lay embargoes . . . ; but the Governor 
shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law, 
statute, or custom of England or Great Britain. 
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1686, 1696 (emphasis 
added). 
 71. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 562–63.  
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the other hand, these other powers could only be exercised “according 
to the laws of the State.” Georgia’s 1777 constitution is particularly 
telling, providing that the governor and council shall “exercise the 
executive powers of government, according to the laws of this State and 
the constitution thereof, save only in the case of pardons and remission 
of fines, which he shall in no instance grant.”72 Here, too, the various 
prerogative powers are all considered “executive powers,” but they are 
all subject to the laws.73 In short, these constitutions seem to have 
included other traditional prerogative powers within the term 
“executive powers” (plural). In the absence of further legislation, the 
chief executive could exercise those powers, but the legislature could 
always step in. It is not entirely clear whether the governors of these 
states could exercise only those executive powers specifically 
enumerated; the point is only that “executive powers” could 
encompass more than mere law execution, but were subject always to 
whatever laws the legislature happened to make.  
New York’s constitution is recognized as the key state model for 
the federal Constitution’s chief executive because it was the only state 
constitution that granted a governor robust executive powers.74 New 
York’s constitution vested “the supreme executive power and 
authority”—in the singular—in a governor.75 The state constitution 
then granted a series of powers similar to those in the federal 
Constitution. The governor was to be commander in chief of the militia 
and admiral of the navy, to have the power to convene the assembly 
and senate on extraordinary occasions and prorogue them under 
 
 72. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 777, 781. 
 73. North Carolina’s 1776 constitution similarly provided that the governor “may exercise 
all the other executive powers of government, limited and restrained as by this Constitution is 
mentioned, and according to the laws of the State.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 5 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2787, 2791–92. 
 74. See Letter from George Read to John Dickinson (May 21, 1787), in WILLIAM 
THOMPSON READ, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE READ 443, (Phila., J.B. Lippincott 
& Co. 1870) (noting that some of the “principal features” of a draft plan for the federal 
constitution “are taken from the New York system of government”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, 
at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (comparing the national executive to 
New York’s executive); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra passim (Alexander Hamilton) (same). 
But see MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 18–19) (challenging the unique relevance of 
New York’s constitution). Notably, Gouverneur Morris, likely the key drafter on the Committee 
of Style and Arrangement in the federal Convention, id. (manuscript at 188, 207), actively 
participated in drafting the New York state constitution in 1777 and was a member of the state’s 
provincial congress that adopted it, id. (manuscript at 243). 
 75. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVII, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2623, 
2632. 
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specified conditions, and to grant reprieves and pardons.76 It then made 
it his duty:  
to inform the legislature . . . of the condition of the State . . . ; to 
recommend such matters to their consideration as shall appear to him 
to concern its good government, welfare, and prosperity; to 
correspond with the Continental Congress, and other States; to 
transact all necessary business with the officers of government . . . ; to 
take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability; 
and to expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the 
legislature.77 
After the state constitution was adopted, the provincial congress 
and executive committees referred to these powers as a whole as 
“executive powers.” For example, in response to a letter from a 
committee in Albany, the statewide Council of Safety wrote via its 
secretary, “I am directed to acquaint you that since the Governor has 
been qualified, the executive powers of the State are vested in him by 
the constitution; therefore, that to him alone all applications respecting 
the militia should be made.”78 In response to a letter from George 
Washington requesting that Governor George Clinton command the 
militia in four New York counties, the Council stated that as Clinton 
was now in charge of the militia under the new constitution, it would 
be unnecessary to make a resolution granting him such power: “On the 
Governor’s admission to office, all the executive powers of the State 
are to be surrendered by the Council to him, and of consequence they 
can neither alter the nature of those powers or place them in any other 
hands.”79 The use of “executive powers” in the plural to refer to the 
command of the militia suggests a broader use of the term 
“executive.”80  
This reading is consistent with the use of the term “executive 
powers,” in the plural, in other Founding-era writings. If Madison’s 
 
 76. Id. art. XVIII, at 2632–33. 
 77. Id. art. XIX, at 2633. 
 78. 1 JOURNALS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, PROVINCIAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE 
OF SAFETY AND COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK: 1775-1776-1777, at 1025 
(Albany, Thurlow Weed 1842). To the author’s knowledge, this Article is the first to examine the 
records of the New York provincial congresses and committees for this purpose. 
 79. Id. at 1014–15. 
 80. To be sure, the militias of the time could be used to help carry law into execution. See, 
e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (granting Congress power to provide for calling for the militia 
to “execute the Laws of the Union,” among other things). The use of the term militia in the above 
context, however, seems clearly to refer to its military function.  
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notes to the Constitutional Convention are accurate, then Charles 
Pinckney “was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive 
powers of ⟨the existing⟩81 Congress might extend to peace & war [etc.] 
which would render the Executive a Monarchy.”82 And in any event, 
these notes show Madison’s use of “executive powers” to describe this 
view, which would also be evidence of the proposition. And John Jay, 
who would be instrumental in early foreign policy matters, wrote in a 
1789 letter that the president “is vested with Powers and Prerogatives 
of far greater Magnitude and Importance, than any that were confided 
to the former Presidents of Congress . . . to whom the great executive 
Powers were not committed; for they were all held and exercised by 
the Congress itself.”83 These usages suggest not only that “executive 
powers” encompassed a broad understanding of “executive,” but also 
that the term was at least sometimes understood to include the 
executive prerogatives generally.  
The best conclusion to draw from these state constitutional 
provisions and other Founding-era material is that, at the time of the 
Founding, “executive powers,” in the plural, was sometimes used to 
describe the entire suite of the traditional royal authorities. This makes 
some sense because once these other powers are assigned to the 
executive, they become executive (adjective) by virtue of the executive 
(noun) possessing them. Thus, “executive powers” could be loosely 
translated as “the executive’s powers.”84 But all of these powers were 
subject to the laws, suggesting that no indefeasible prerogative power 
could be exercised by the chief executive except as specifically 
provided for in the state constitution. Therefore, when the term “the 
executive power” was used, it is unlikely that it referred to a set of 
unenumerated prerogative powers uncontrollable by the legislature. 
Indeed, when the authors of the state constitutions clearly indicated 
that the “executive powers” included the suite of other prerogatives, 
they used the plural and, again, indicated that they were subject to law. 
“The executive power,” in the singular, may still have been only the 
power to carry law into execution. There is no suggestion in the New 
 
 81. As explained in FARRAND, supra note 19, at xvi–xix, pairs of angle brackets enclose 
material that Madison added later in life as he prepared his notes of the convention for 
posthumous publication. 
 82. Id. at 64–65. 
 83. Letter from John Jay, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Giuseppe Chiappe, Agent of the U.S. 
at Mogador (Dec. 1, 1789), in 5 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 168, 169 (Elizabeth M. 
Nuxoll ed., 2017).  
 84. I thank Matthew Steilen for suggesting this nice formulation. 
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York Constitution or in the similar Pennsylvania Constitution85 that 
the vesting of “the executive power,” in the singular, included all of the 
royal prerogative powers.86  
3. Hamilton as Pacificus.  Alexander Hamilton himself recognized 
the plausibility of both the residual vesting and law-execution readings 
of the term “the executive power.” He appealed to both possibilities in 
his debate with Madison over the Neutrality Proclamation, by which 
President Washington declared the country’s neutrality vis-à-vis 
France and England in 1793.87 Hamilton’s discussion of “the executive 
power” is a staple of the executive power literature and the existing 
debate, and he is often believed to have been the first to articulate the 
residual reading of the clause.88 
Hamilton’s first justification for the Neutrality Proclamation was 
that the president “is charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which 
Treaties form a part,” and he must therefore interpret existing treaties 
 
 85. The 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution provided that “[t]he supreme executive power shall 
be vested in a president and council,” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 70, at 3081, 3084, and in its twentieth section provided that the president and council 
“shall have power to appoint” officers “agreeable to this frame of government, and the laws that 
may be made hereafter”; to fill vacancies; “to correspond with other states, and transact business 
with the officers of government, civil and military; . . . to prepare such business as may appear to 
them necessary to lay before the general assembly”; to hear impeachments; and to grant pardons, 
id. § 20, at 3087. They were “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and “to expedite 
the execution of such measures as may be resolved upon by the general assembly.” Id. § 20, at 
3088. They could draw appropriated sums, lay temporary embargoes during the legislative recess, 
and call together the general assembly. Id. “The president shall be commander in chief of the 
forces of the state . . . .” Id. 
 86. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions did not grant “the executive 
power” or “executive powers.” They simply declared that there shall be a supreme executive 
magistrate and listed a variety of authorities. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. II, § I, reprinted in 3 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 1888, 1899–1903; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, §§ XLI–LIX, 
reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2471, 2481–84. South Carolina’s obliquely 
provided that “the executive authority be vested in the president and commander-in-chief, limited 
and restrained as aforesaid.” S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 70, at 3241, 3247. New Jersey’s provided that the governor “shall have the supreme executive 
power, be Chancellor of the Colony, and act as captain-general and commander in chief of all the 
militia, and other military force in this Colony.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 2594, 2596. Rhode Island and Connecticut continued to be 
governed by their seventeenth-century charters. See 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 70, at 529, 536 
(recording no governing constitutional replacements or amendments for Connecticut between 
1662 and 1818); 6 id. at 3211, 3222 (recording no intervening constitutional amendments or 
replacements for Rhode Island between 1663 and 1842). 
 87. For more on the Neutrality Proclamation, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 88. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1172; Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, 
at 679–84; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 330, 334–39. 
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(and determine if they are even in force).89 He went on to say that 
“[t]he President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our 
Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land. He 
who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their 
meaning.”90 As Professor Harrison writes, here Hamilton “realized 
that some of his readers might take the Whig view” of executive 
power.91 
Yet Hamilton also offered the alternative, residual view: “The 
general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE 
POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the 
exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the 
instrument.”92 And he includes the power of declaring war to be one 
such qualification,93 thereby going beyond the law-execution reading. 
Hamilton, in other words, provides support for both readings of “the 
executive power.” This suggests that the residual vesting thesis—
supported also by the terminology of Montesquieu and the Essex 
Result—was certainly a possible reading at the Founding. But 
Hamilton’s dual analysis also suggests that the residual vesting thesis 
“was less central to Hamilton’s analysis than proponents of the [t]hesis 
typically acknowledge.”94 
B. “The Executive Power” in Blackstone 
Again, examining the variety of sources available to the Founding 
generation suggests some ambiguity in the term “the executive power,” 
particularly as it was used in the eighteenth century. Even so, the law-
execution reading seems to have more support. This Section examines 
Blackstone’s text—which will be relevant to several parts of the 
argument to come—and shows that even Blackstone seems to use “the 
executive power” in both senses in dispute.  
In his two chapters on the royal prerogative, Blackstone divides 
the king’s prerogative powers into three categories: the king’s “royal 
character,” his “royal authority,” and his “royal income.”95 In the 
 
 89. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 11. 
 90. Id. at 16. 
 91. Harrison, supra note 20, at 50. 
 92. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 13 (alteration in original).  
 93. Id. 
 94. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 682. 
 95. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 233 (“These substantive or direct prerogatives 
may . . . be divided into three kinds: being such as regard, first, the king’s royal character; secondly, 
his royal authority; and, lastly, his royal income.”). 
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second of these two chapters, Blackstone deals entirely with the king’s 
royal revenue.96 The first deals with the king’s royal character, or 
“dignity,” and the royal authority, or “power.”97 
Blackstone begins with the royal “dignity,” under which he 
includes the king’s attributes of sovereignty, sovereign immunity 
(immunity from suit), and perpetuity.98 Then, Blackstone turns to the 
second part of the king’s prerogatives. “We are next to consider those 
branches of the royal prerogative,” Blackstone writes, “which invest 
. . . our sovereign lord . . . with a number of authorities and powers; in 
the exertion whereof consists the executive part of government.”99 
Here, Blackstone describes powers that almost all appear somewhere 
in the Constitution.  
These powers deal either with “th[e] nation’s intercourse with 
foreign nations, or it’s100 own domestic government and civil polity.”101 
The former category includes the powers to send and receive 
ambassadors; to make treaties, leagues, and alliances; to make war and 
peace; to issue letters of marque and reprisal; to grant safe conduct in 
times of conflict; and to admit strangers (foreigners) into the country.102 
The latter, domestic powers include the power to veto legislation; be 
commander in chief (or “generalissimo”); raise and regulate fleets and 
armies; and erect forts and similar buildings.103 The king is also “the 
fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege,” by which he may, for 
example, grant titles of nobility.104 This includes the power to create 
and dispose of offices and to naturalize aliens and erect corporations.105 
The king is the arbiter of commerce, regulates weights and measures, 
and may coin money.106 He is also the head of the Church of England.107  
As Blackstone continues, he seems to use “the executive power” 
in both senses in dispute. On the one hand, Blackstone gets to law 
execution as he further discusses the king’s prerogatives. He writes that 
 
 96. Id. at 271. 
 97. Id. at 233–34. 
 98. Id. at 234–42. 
 99. Id. at 242. 
 100. For a comment regarding the possessive use of “it’s,” see supra note 12.  
 101. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 245. 
 102. Id. at 245–53. 
 103. Id. at 253–57. 
 104. Id. at 261–62. 
 105. Id. at 262–63. 
 106. Id. at 263–68. 
 107. Id. at 269. 
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the king is “the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace 
of the kingdom.”108 This means the king is “the proper person to 
prosecute for all public offenses and breaches of the peace,” may grant 
pardons, and may nominate judges.109 The king has the power to make 
proclamations as to “the manner, time, and circumstances of putting 
[the] laws in execution.”110 Tellingly, Blackstone goes on to write that 
the king may create judicial tribunals, “for, though the constitution of 
the kingdom hath entrusted him with the whole executive power of the 
laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally 
carry into execution this great and extensive trust,” and so “courts 
should be erected, to assist him in executing this power.”111 Blackstone 
seems to use the phrase “the executive power of the laws” as the power 
to execute the laws enacted by the kingdom’s legislative body. Here, 
“the executive power” is a subset of the numerous “authorities and 
powers” that Blackstone promised to describe. 
On the other hand, at the end of this entire discussion, Blackstone 
writes: “[The preceding chapter] considered at large those branches of 
the king’s prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and 
constitute the executive power of the government.”112 This seems to 
suggest that all of the prerogative powers—save for those involving the 
royal dignity or the royal revenue—constitute “the executive power.” 
Professor Mortenson claims that the use here may refer to the 
executive authority—that is, the king himself.113 This is possible, but 
the executive authority also is responsible for the two other branches 
of prerogative (the royal dignity and revenue). Thus, “the executive 
power” here may instead refer to all the “powers and authorities” that 
Blackstone discusses between his analyses of the royal character and 
the royal revenue.  
Blackstone’s use of “executive power,” in short, is cause for some 
pause. Although the evidence, put together, does strongly favor the 
law-execution reading, it is at least possible that by Blackstone’s time 
the phrase could have also referred to all the royal powers and 
authorities, save for those involving the royal dignity and revenue.  
 
 108. Id. at 257. 
 109. Id. at 259. 
 110. Id. at 261. 
 111. Id. at 257 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
 113. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1249 n.343.  
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II.  “THE EXECUTIVE POWER” IN CONVENTION 
This Part seeks to show that, notwithstanding any ambiguity from 
the textual sources canvassed in Part I, the proceedings at the 
Constitutional Convention make the law-execution reading much 
more plausible than the residual reading. Part II.A confirms 
Blackstone’s influence on the drafting of the Constitution, which 
contains almost all of the power and authorities attributed to the king 
by Blackstone. At the very least, this confirms that defining and 
assigning the known royal prerogatives to the various branches of 
government was a central motivation of the Framers, and Blackstone 
was a leading expositor of those prerogatives. Not only does this 
confirm the influence of prerogative, but it suggests a reason to 
discount the residual vesting thesis: if the delegates thought they were 
already accounting for all of the royal powers, it seems unlikely they 
would have thought they needed to grant a residuary of executive 
powers. Part II.B analyzes the few prerogatives mentioned in 
Blackstone but not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution and argues that 
these omissions also suggest that it is unlikely the drafters understood 
themselves to be creating a residual grant of prerogative power. Part 
II.C details the Convention’s resolutions and the silence of the 
ratification debates, both of which further support the law-execution 
reading. Part II.D reexamines the three vesting clauses and proposes 
that they make the most sense if “the executive power” indeed refers 
only to law execution. Part II.E summarizes.  
A. Distributing Prerogative Powers 
A comparison of Blackstone’s chapter on the king’s powers and 
authorities and the U.S. Constitution leaves little doubt that 
Blackstone influenced the form the Constitution took. Almost every 
single prerogative discussed is specifically assigned somewhere in the 
Constitution114: to send ambassadors (president and Senate);115 to 
receive ambassadors (president);116 to make treaties, leagues, and 
alliances (president and Senate);117 to make war and peace (Congress 
 
 114. Compare supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text, with infra notes 115–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . .”). 
 116. Id. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . .”). 
 117. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”). 
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has the power to declare war, the president to wage it);118 to issue letters 
of marque and reprisal (Congress);119 to veto legislation (president 
subject to override);120 to be commander in chief (president);121 to raise 
and regulate fleets and armies (Congress);122 to erect forts and similar 
buildings (Congress);123 to grant titles of nobility (specifically 
forbidden);124 to naturalize aliens (Congress);125 to create offices 
(Congress);126 to regulate commerce and weights and measures, and to 
 
 118. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War . . . .”); id. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States . . . .”).  
 119. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To . . . grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water . . . .”). 
 120. The veto power and its override are delineated as follows: 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, 
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations 
prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
 121. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States . . . .”). 
 122. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12–14 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support 
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; [and] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 
the land and naval Forces . . . .”). 
 123. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 17 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to exercise [exclusive] 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the 
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 
Buildings . . . .”). 
 124. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”). 
 125. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization . . . .”).  
 126. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (noting that offices are “established by Law”); see also id. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers.”).  
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coin money (Congress);127 to institute judicial tribunals (Congress);128 
and to nominate and appoint judges (president and Senate).129 
If the Framers assigned all or nearly all of the known prerogative 
powers, it is not clear why any of them would have thought it necessary 
to create a residual grant of powers. The most serious objection to this 
observation is that many foreign affairs powers are nonetheless 
missing. Yet Blackstone himself wrote that the king had all of the 
foreign affairs powers but then numbered among the king’s relevant 
prerogatives—he called them the “principal” prerogatives relating to 
foreign intercourse130—only those that also happened to find their way 
into the Constitution.  
More still, the delegates in the Constitutional Convention likely 
did not think these powers were missing. As the delegates were 
debating the Committee of Detail draft, which gave the Senate the 
power over treaties and ambassadorial appointments,131 Charles 
Pinckney observed that “the Senate is to have the power of making 
treaties & managing our foreign affairs.”132 He later opposed giving the 
House a say in the decision to “make war,” stating that “[t]he Senate 
would be the best depositary” of this power, “being more acquainted 
with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.”133 Earlier 
in the proceedings, James Wilson described the powers over foreign 
commerce and war and peace to be the principal foreign affairs powers: 
“Every nation attends to its foreign intercourse — to support its 
commerce — to prevent foreign contempt and to make war and peace. 
Our senate will be possessed of these powers, and therefore ought to 
be dignified and permanent.”134 These two delegates seemed to believe 
 
 127. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 5 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; . . . To coin Money, 
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and 
Measures . . . .”). 
 128. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 9 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to 
the supreme Court . . . .”).  
 129. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States . . . .”).  
 130. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 253. 
 131. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 183 (“The Senate of the United States shall have power to 
make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the supreme Court.”).  
 132. Id. at 235.  
 133. Id. at 318. 
 134. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 432–33 (reporting Yates’s notes). Madison recorded more 
of Wilson’s explanation:  
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that power over ambassadorial appointments, treaty making, war and 
peace, and foreign commerce conveyed all the relevant foreign affairs 
powers.  
In fact, it appears that the power to make treaties may have 
included the power to “treat” with foreign nations generally. The 
Committee on Postponed Matters, for example, considered the 
following resolution: “The Senate shall have power to treat with 
foreign nations, but no Treaty shall be binding on the United States 
which is not ratified by a Law.”135 At least in this formulation, the 
power to make treaties was included within the power to “treat.” 
Samuel Johnson’s 1755 dictionary defined “to treat” as “1. To 
discourse; to make discussions . . . . 2. To practice negotiation . . . . 3. 
To come to terms of accommodation . . . . 4. To make gratuitous 
entertainments.”136 To treat therefore would include a general power 
of “managing foreign affairs.” Of course, the ultimate power conferred 
in the Constitution was to make treaties; but this requires the nation to 
treat with other nations—that is, to engage in negotiations and general 
discourse. The power to treat generally might thus be implicit in the 
power to make treaties. Part IV revisits this issue in more detail, but 
for now it suffices to say that by assigning and distributing the 
“principal”137 foreign affairs prerogatives mentioned by Blackstone, it 
appears the delegates thought they were sufficiently conferring all of 
the relevant foreign affairs powers, eliminating the need for a residual 
grant of power.  
B. Two Key Omissions 
There are, to be sure, still a few differences between Blackstone’s 
list of prerogatives and those in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution 
does not make the president the head of any church. There was no 
established church at the national level of the American constitutional 
regime, and so such a power would have been unnecessary (not to 
mention improper). There is no specific power in the U.S. Constitution 
 
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. 
It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within but has wars to avoid & 
treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depositary of the 
powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the 
eyes of foreign nations. 
Id. at 425–26.  
 135. 2 id. at 382–83. 
 136. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2092 (London, W. 
Strahan 1755). 
 137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
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over passports, but arguably regulating passports is necessary and 
proper to carry into effect the naturalization power or the foreign 
commerce power.138 The two key powers from Blackstone that seem to 
be missing in the Constitution are the power to erect corporations and 
the power over immigration (the power to admit strangers). This 
Section explores the Framers’ likely views on these powers and 
concludes that those views are inconsistent with a residual grant of 
power. 
1. The Power To Erect Corporations.  As described above,139 
Blackstone included the power to erect corporations as a prerogative 
power. Because “the king has also the prerogative of conferring 
privileges upon private persons,” he has “the prerogative of erecting 
corporations; whereby a number of private persons are united and knit 
together, and enjoy many liberties, powers, and immunities in their 
politic capacity, which they were utterly incapable of in their 
natural.”140 This power is nowhere found in the Constitution, and the 
omission of it may help resolve the meaning of the grant of “the 
executive power.”  
The debate in the Convention over a power of incorporation was 
short. It occurred on September 14,141 when the Constitution was 
nearly in its final form.142 Benjamin Franklin moved to add a power in 
Article I, Section 8 to allow Congress to “provide for cutting canals.”143 
Madison then “suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power 
‘to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might 
 
 138. As Justice Scalia explained, 
The naturalization power also enables Congress to furnish the people it makes citizens 
with papers verifying their citizenship—say a consular report of birth abroad (which 
certifies citizenship of an American born outside the United States) or a passport 
(which certifies citizenship for purposes of international travel). As the Necessary and 
Proper Clause confirms, every congressional power “carries with it all those incidental 
powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution.”  
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 69 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 429 (1821)). The majority in Zivotofsky II 
held that such a power belongs to the president by virtue of the Receptions Clause, see id. at 10–
13 (majority opinion), but that clause is framed as a duty (and quite a narrow one) and not a 
power. For an argument that the passport power may be necessary and proper to the foreign 
commerce power, see MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 227–28).  
 139. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 140. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 263.  
 141. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 612–20. 
 142. The final draft of the Constitution was adopted only three days later, on September 17. 
Id. at 641–49. 
 143. See id. at 615. 
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require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be 
incompetent,’” with the primary objective being “to secure an easy 
communication between the States which the free intercourse now to 
be opened, seemed to call for.”144  
Rufus King objected, arguing that “[t]he States will be prejudiced 
and divided into parties by it—In Philada. & New York, It will be 
referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of 
contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to 
mercantile monopolies.”145 James Wilson responded that providing for 
banks would probably not “excite the prejudices & parties 
apprehended,” and that providing for mercantile monopolies was 
already implied by the power to regulate trade (perhaps in 
combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause).146 George Mason, 
however, supported “limiting the power [of incorporation] to the single 
case of Canals” because “[h]e was afraid of monopolies of every sort, 
which he did not think were by any means already implied by the 
Constitution as supposed by Mr. Wilson.”147  
The motion was so modified to be limited only to the power to 
incorporate companies for the cutting of canals and was rejected by a 
vote of 8–3.148 Madison’s notes then state, “The other part fell of 
course, as including the power rejected.”149 In other words, the general 
power of incorporation was rejected because it would have included 
the rejected power to incorporate companies for the purpose of cutting 
canals and making other internal improvements. 
Although this episode lends itself to more than one possible 
inference, the most plausible is that the delegates intended to deny the 
national government a power to grant charters of incorporation. 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 616. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. Of course, recent scholarship shows that Madison appears to have revised his notes 
of the Convention later in his life. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 179 (2015) (“In the fall of 1789, Madison turned back to the 
Notes. . . . As he composed the Notes after August 21, he may have recast his comments and 
speeches. Madison also revised the Notes, adding and detailing procedural details.”); see supra 
note 81. But in this case, there is no reason to doubt the sequence of events or the general concerns 
of the delegates. Professor Bilder does not question this episode in her book when discussing how 
it was later relied upon by Thomas Jefferson in the debate over incorporating a bank. BILDER, 
supra, at 206–07. Additionally, James McHenry’s notes of the same day confirm that there were 
two motions—one for cutting canals and the other a general incorporation power—and that the 
incorporation power was rejected. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 620. 
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Wilson, to be sure, suggested that some power to incorporate may be 
implied by other legislative powers, and so it could be that a power to 
erect corporations was rejected as unnecessary. But Wilson did not 
offer his suggestion as a reason to reject the proposal; he was arguing 
in favor of it, and so it is reasonable to assume that the delegates who 
voted to reject the proposal did so because they did not want the 
national government to have any power to erect corporations at all. 
And yet, to none of these delegates did it occur that such a power might 
exist by virtue of Article II’s Vesting Clause.  
This intent is at least suggestive of how the delegates understood 
the meaning of “the executive power.” Notwithstanding their vote, if 
the residual vesting thesis is correct, then such a power to erect 
corporations was not merely implied, it was expressly granted by the 
Executive Vesting Clause—and not a single delegate who wanted to 
deny this power, whether or not they in fact constituted the majority, 
sounded the alarm. Even Wilson had to infer such a power by 
implication from specific grants of legislative power; it did not occur to 
him, either, that such a power might belong to the executive.  
2. The Immigration Prerogative.  There was no debate in the 
Convention over the power to admit foreigners. Blackstone described 
such a power as a royal prerogative, but it appears nowhere in the 
constitutional text. The exact location of the federal immigration 
power is unclear and remains contested among originalist scholars.150 
The clause about the Atlantic slave trade suggests that the delegates 
believed the states would retain primary control over immigration, but 
that Congress might override their decisions.151 The foreign commerce 
 
 150. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Does the Constitution Give the Federal Government Power over 
Immigration?, CATO UNBOUND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/09/12/ilya-
somin/does-constitution-give-federal-government-power-over-immigration [https://perma.cc/
K9SE-KN98] (arguing there is no federal power over immigration); Christopher R. Green, 
Tribes, Nations, States: Our Three Commerce Powers 26–27 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the immigration power follows from Congress’s power 
to regulate commerce “with” foreign nations).  
 151. The clause temporarily limited Congress’s ability to interfere with State discretion:  
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; see also MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 181) (“The wording 
of the Slave Trade Clause . . . strongly suggests that the states were thought to have primary 
authority over immigration, but that Congress has power to preempt state law and create a federal 
legal regime.”).  
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power may have permitted controlling the importation of slaves—and 
the transporting of individuals152—but it hardly follows that Congress 
can control generally who has a right to come to reside in the United 
States for purposes other than trade.153 There may also be creative ways 
to exercise the immigration power. For example, presumably the states 
could cede a strip of territory along all United States borders to the 
federal government, which could then control who crosses these 
borders through its plenary power over the territories.154 
Not only did the delegates therefore assume Congress or the states 
would have the power over immigration, but they likely understood 
that the immigration prerogative had fallen into disuse. As Professor 
McConnell explains, “The last time a monarch had exercised the 
prerogative to expel a class of foreigners was in 1575, under Elizabeth, 
and according to most historians, ‘[t]his branch of the prerogative . . . 
ha[d] been allowed to fall into desuetude, and may be regarded as no 
longer existing.’”155 In 1792, the British government investigated 
whether the monarch had authority to exclude thousands of refugees 
from revolutionary France without parliamentary approval; the 
conclusion was that the king had no power to exclude “alien friends”—
that is, foreigners from friendly countries.156 Congress apparently took 
this same position during the debates over the Alien Acts in 1798. “No 
one,” according to McConnell, “even suggested that [President] 
Adams had inherent presidential authority to deport aliens from 
countries not at war with the United States. This suggests that the 
 
 152. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 215–16 (1824) (holding that the transportation 
of people is “commerce”).  
 153. In his interesting new paper, Professor Christopher Green argues quite persuasively that 
the Framers understood commerce “with foreign nations” to encompass any commercial 
interactions between American citizens and subjects of foreign states, wherever that commerce 
occurs, and that this would include a power to control all foreigners present in the United States. 
Green, supra note 150, at 6, 26–27. Green’s evidence is persuasive, and perhaps the power to 
regulate every commercial interaction implies the ability to exclude and expel aliens, but the case 
is not foolproof and in any event Congress’s power was controverted early on in the debate over 
the Alien Enemies Act. See infra note 158. 
 154. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any 
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”). I first heard of this possibility at an 
originalism works-in-progress conference hosted by the University of San Diego.  
 155. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 180) (alterations in original) (quoting H.S.Q. 
HENRIQUES, THE LAW OF ALIENS AND NATURALIZATION 11 (1906)). 
 156. Id. 
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founders did not share Blackstone’s more capacious interpretation of 
executive authority on this point.”157 
Putting these points together indicates the constitutional drafters 
likely understood the royal immigration prerogative to be obsolete, 
and they seem to have assumed Congress would have the power over 
immigration. But on both points, there was ambiguity. As to the first, 
the drafters’ key guide on executive power, Blackstone, described the 
power over aliens as a royal prerogative. As to the second, they did not 
expressly grant to Congress the power to exclude alien friends,158 if they 
intended to grant such a power to the national government at all. Yet 
if the Executive Vesting Clause is a residual grant of prerogative 
powers, then it would be easy for future presidents to argue they had a 
plenary immigration power. Indeed, in 1950, the Supreme Court held 
that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty” that 
“stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive 
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. When Congress 
prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not 
dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent 
executive power.”159 
It seems highly unlikely both that the delegates would have 
intended to leave this possibility open and that they would have been 
unaware of such a possibility if they had granted a residuum of royal 
power to the executive. The Declaration of Independence had 
complained that the king “has endeavored to prevent the population 
of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for 
Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their 
migrations hither.”160 And they do not appear to have simply forgotten 
about this issue at the Convention; in opposition to a motion to 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Unless Professor Green is correct. See Green, supra note 150, at 26–27. Even if he is 
correct that the power over commerce with foreign nations allows Congress to control every local 
commercial interaction by aliens, the prerogative power, as described in Blackstone, was much 
more explicit. See supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text. Indeed, the lack of clarity in the 
Constitution led very quickly to the federal immigration power being controverted in 1798. See, 
e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), res. 4, reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131, 132 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Resolved, 
That alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state wherein they 
are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States . . . .”).  
 159. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citations omitted); 
see also MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 181) (“The modern Supreme Court, without 
explanation, has assumed that the implied federal power over immigration is not only plenary but 
virtually exclusive of the states.”). 
 160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).  
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increase the residency requirement for a U.S. Senator to fourteen 
years, for example, Oliver Ellsworth objected that he “was opposed to 
the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this 
Country.”161 It is unlikely that they would have left such a power to the 
president and that they would have been blind to this possibility under 
a residual grant of power. Far more plausibly, the grant of “the 
executive power” did not include a residuum of prerogative power at 
all.  
C. The Convention’s Instruction, and Ratification  
The above arguments make a compelling case against a residual 
grant of power, particularly when combined with several general 
aspects of the Convention’s proceedings. The Virginia Plan would have 
granted a national executive “general authority to execute the National 
laws” as well as “the Executive rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation.”162 In the June 1 debate over this provision, several 
delegates worried it would grant too much power to the national 
executive. James Wilson, for example, said that he “did not consider 
the prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining 
the Executive powers” because some of them “were of a Legislative 
nature,” such as “that of war & peace [etc.] The only powers he 
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and 
appointing officers, not ⟨appertaining to and⟩ appointed by the 
Legislature.”163 According to Rufus King’s notes, Wilson also argued 
that “Extive. powers are designed for the execution of Laws, and 
appointing Officers not otherwise to be appointed.”164  
Madison defined “executive” power similarly, saying it was the 
“power to carry into effect[] the national laws[,] to appoint to offices in 
cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers” 
not of a legislative or judicial nature “as may from time to time be 
delegated by the national Legislature.”165 The last clause on delegated 
power was struck as being included within the power to carry into 
effect the national laws, and the motion then carried.166  
 
 161. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 235. 
 162. 1 id. at 21; id. at 62–63.  
 163. Id. at 65–66. 
 164. Id. at 70.  
 165. Id. at 67. 
 166. Id.  
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On the one hand, Professor Harrison concludes from all this that 
the delegates intended to retain only the power to execute the laws 
(and appoint officers not otherwise provided for) and to reject a 
general grant of other “executive rights” in the president.167 Both 
Wilson’s and Madison’s statements also support the proposition that 
“executive” power was thought to be only the power to execute law 
and to appoint necessary assistants. This view is also consistent with 
Madison’s strategy to decide on the executive’s powers before 
“determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single 
officer.”168 The ultimate adoption of a unitary, as opposed to plural, 
executive with only power to execute the laws and limited other 
prerogatives is consistent with the Convention’s instruction and the 
discussion among the delegates.169  
The residual vesting thesis, on the other hand, implies that the 
Committee of Detail ignored the Convention’s instruction from June 1 
and the spirit of the debate that occurred. That is exactly what 
McConnell, for one, claims. According to him, the Convention decided 
to vest in the president only the powers of “law execution, appointment 
of offices other than judges, and a qualified veto.”170 “Undeterred,” 
McConnell writes, “the Committee of Detail reinstated a vesting clause 
at least as broad as the original Resolution Seven. It stated, ‘The 
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single 
person.’ So much for preparing a draft ‘conformable’ to the 
Convention’s decisions.”171 
More still, not a single opponent of the Constitution over the 
course of Ratification, including those who spoke about executive 
power, so much as mentioned the possibility of a residual grant of 
power. McConnell again recognizes the point, describes this silence as 
a “significant dog that did not bark,” and recognizes that the “Anti-
Federalists did not apparently perceive the possibility that the Vesting 
 
 167. Harrison, supra note 20, at 37. Yates’ concise and otherwise unhelpful notes of the day 
list only “[a] general authority to execute the laws” and “[t]o appoint all officers not otherwise 
provided for” as executive powers “[a]greed to.” FARRAND, supra note 19, at 70. 
 168. FARRAND, supra note 19, at 67. 
 169. The delegates agreed to a unitary executive on July 17. 2 id. at 22. 
 170. Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson’s Contributions to the Construction of Article II, 
17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 40 (2019). 
 171. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 185). 
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Clause of Article II might convey unenumerated powers to the 
President.”172 
Consider the sheer amount of inconvenient facts that the 
proponents of a residual grant of power must ignore. To maintain the 
residual vesting thesis, they must believe that the Committee of Detail 
ignored the Convention’s instruction; that none of the delegates 
realized the possibility that a power to erect corporations, as a 
prerogative power, would be vested in the president despite their 
explicit vote to deny the national government that power; that none 
was aware of the risk that a president might someday claim a 
prerogative power over immigration; and that the silence of the Anti-
Federalists was an oversight instead of a clear indication that few at the 
time understood “the executive power” to include a residual grant of 
prerogatives.173 A reading of “the executive power” to mean only the 
power to execute the laws is consistent with the Convention’s 
instructions, with the delegates’ other votes, and with the Anti-
Federalists’ deafening silence. 
D. The Vesting Clauses Reconsidered 
The Constitution’s three vesting clauses make the most sense if 
“the executive power” refers only to the power to execute law. The 
legislative power, the executive power, and the judicial power each 
refers to a single function: the power to make laws, the power to 
 
 172. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 75). Mortenson’s extensive research also has 
not come up with any barking dogs:  
Others have observed the failure of royal residuum theorists to identify even one 
positive assertion of the claim during drafting or ratification. I’ve managed no better 
on their behalf. Despite reviewing tens of thousands of pages of commentary from 
hundreds of writers and speakers—and going to an abundance of caution to flag all 
instances that even vaguely tickled my antennae for a second and third review with as 
generous a mindset as could be mustered—I have been unable to find a single 
statement that the Executive Power Clause contained a substantive residuum.  
Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 90) (footnote omitted). 
Mortenson also points out the total silence in the North Carolina ratifying convention when they 
discussed “the executive power” clause; no one seemed to be at all bothered by it. Id. (manuscript 
at 93). The concerns were all about the other powers granted to the president. Id. 
 173. To be sure, perhaps the Anti-Federalists did not sound the alarm because most of the 
prerogatives had already been assigned away from the president or otherwise limited. That seems 
rather unlikely, however, given the uncertainty surrounding the power to erect corporations and 
the immigration prerogative, two important historic prerogative powers that would have been 
familiar to the Anti-Federalists. If the Anti-Federalists had believed that the Executive Vesting 
Clause included a residuum of prerogative powers, surely at least one of them would have realized 
the risk that these two prerogatives might be thought to belong to the president. 
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execute those laws, and the power to adjudicate disputes—at least 
those affecting life, liberty, or property174—according to those laws.  
This taxonomy is the only one that accounts for the variations in 
the vesting clauses. Under the standard accounts, there is always 
something odd about the different formulations. Article I vests all 
legislative powers (plural) herein granted, and then has an 
enumeration of power; Article II vests “the executive power,” with a 
subsequent enumeration of additional powers; and Article III vests 
“the judicial power” with an enumeration of the jurisdiction to which 
that judicial power extends, but not an enumeration of judicial powers. 
Under the residual vesting thesis, “the executive power” is a grant of 
multiple, executive-type powers, yet “the judicial power” seems to be 
a single function. The disconnect between Articles I and III is even 
greater. If the enumeration of jurisdiction in Article III is analogous to 
the enumeration in Article I, then it would have been more natural to 
provide that “all judicial powers herein granted” are vested in the 
courts, or conversely that “the legislative power shall be vested in 
Congress,” with a subsequent enumeration of the subject matters to 
which the legislative power “shall extend.”  
The simplest and most likely answer is that “the judicial power” is 
a single function, “the executive power” is a single function, and “the 
legislative power” is a single function. Describing the function does 
not, however, indicate when that function may be performed. Hence, 
Article III enumerates the jurisdiction of the federal courts. “The 
executive power” is similarly limited to executing whatever laws 
Congress has enacted, and therefore is limited by the enumeration of 
power in Article I, Section 8. Unlike the judiciary, which has only the 
judicial power, and unlike the executive, which has only “the executive 
power” and a few other specifically enumerated powers traditionally 
associated with the executive authority, the Convention arguably 
assigned Congress much more than just “the legislative power.”  
 
 174. The “core” or “exclusive” judicial power—the power that only judges could exercise—
was the adjudication of disputes that led to such deprivations of private rights. Public rights cases, 
in contrast, could be adjudicated either by the courts or one of the other two branches of 
government. See Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 
(1856) (distinguishing between matters which are “the subject of a suit at the common law, or in 
equity, or admiralty,” which must be exercised by courts, and those “involving public rights,” 
which are amenable to judicial resolution “but which congress may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”); William Baude, 
Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515–16, 1516 n.9 (2020) (noting 
historical exceptions to the power of the judiciary to adjudicate disputes).  
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Congress, that is to say, does a lot more than just make laws. In 
fact, it received most of the historic prerogative powers, like declaring 
war. Yet “declaring war” is not making law—it does not prescribe a 
rule of civil conduct. Neither is borrowing or coining money, or issuing 
letters of marque, for that matter. Thus, the drafters had to give some 
indication that Congress was getting significantly more power than 
simply “the legislative power.”175 To be sure, Congress can often 
exercise these powers by making laws—that is, by making general rules 
that prescribe the conduct of private individuals or executive officials. 
But Congress can also exercise such powers by joint resolution.176 It can 
in this way issue a declaration of war or a letter of marque, neither of 
which can be described as a “law.” 
The Vesting Clause of Article I was a natural way for the drafters 
to indicate this expansion: “All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be” vested in Congress. Not just “the legislative power,” and not “only 
such legislative powers as are herein granted,” which would have been 
a more natural formulation to signal a limitation and enumeration of 
power. The Article I Vesting Clause, in other words, might indicate a 
defined and limited scope of legislative powers; but it appears to have 
also been a signal that the Constitution was expanding the powers of 
the legislative branch beyond a baseline grant of “the” legislative 
power. 
To be sure, this analysis depends on a perhaps too narrow 
definition of “the legislative power” as the power to create rules of civil 
conduct.177 “The legislative power” could be understood more broadly 
 
 175. This is not to suggest that these powers could not have been considered legislative even 
when they belonged to the executive. After all, the executive historically had some legislative 
power, namely the veto. Recall also that Wilson argued in Convention that the powers of war and 
peace were “legislative.” FARRAND, supra note 19, at 65–66. Congress could also make laws with 
respect to any of these prerogatives, for example by authorizing the executive to issue letters of 
marque or to borrow money. The point is only that it is not obvious that these prerogatives 
required the making of laws or that they were in their nature legislative; they all went under the 
label “prerogative” and historically belonged to the king. It therefore makes some sense that the 
delegates, when assigning these powers to the legislature, would emphasize the point by vesting 
all legislative powers in Congress.  
 176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.  
 177. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 74, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (defining 
the legislative power as the power “to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society”); Larry 
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1310–17 (2003) (canvassing similar statements from Locke, 
Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Founding-era sources to support a definition of legislative power 
similar to that of Hamilton).  
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as the power to create and change legal relations.178 A declaration of 
war and a letter of marque fall squarely within this broader definition. 
For example, a letter of marque changes the rules of civil conduct by 
authorizing the private capturing of enemy merchant vessels. Although 
this may be right, it was nevertheless disputed at the Convention 
whether certain prerogative powers were more legislative or executive 
in nature.179 Specifically designating these prerogatives as legislative 
“powers” was a good way to signal a position on the question. 
Treating each of the three major powers as a single function is not 
only logical, it appears to be the way Gouverneur Morris, the head of 
the Committee of Style, and who might have even worked on the 
constitutional draft mostly alone,180 used the terms. In support of a 
Council of Revision, and responding to objections about blending 
powers, Morris (according to Madison) described “the three powers” 
as “the power of making[,] . . . of executing, and . . . of judging, the 
laws.”181 This taxonomy also has support in other Founding-era sources 
when the three powers were discussed together. For example, 
Montesquieu wrote, “All would be lost if the same man or the same 
body of principal men . . . exercised these three powers: that of making 
the laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the 
crimes or the disputes of individuals.”182 In an encomium to the 
inhabitants of Quebec and the separation of powers, the delegates to 
the Continental Congress in 1774 wrote of the Quebecois that their 
governor was “vested with the executive powers, or the powers of 
administration,” in the governor and council was “lodged the power of 
making laws,” and their judges were “to decide every cause affecting 
your lives, liberty or property.”183  
In conclusion, it seems likely that the Constitution deploys each 
power in the sense of its single function: the power to make law, 
execute law, and adjudicate disputes—at least those affecting life, 
 
 178. I am grateful to Professor Harrison for pointing out this possibility to me. 
 179. See supra note 46 (describing statements from James Wilson). 
 180. THACH, JR., supra note 10, at 138. 
 181. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 79. 
 182. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 49, at 157. 
 183. Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec (Oct. 
26, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 104, 110 (1904). I am indebted to 
Professor Mortenson for this reference. See Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 
(manuscript at 66–67). 
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liberty, and property—under the law. That is how Founding-era 
sources used the terms.184  
E. Summary 
Part I demonstrated that the textual meaning of “the executive 
power” is ambiguous but tends to support the law-execution reading. 
Part II offered a more comprehensive argument that the residual 
vesting thesis is implausible based on the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention, the delegates’ likely views, and the silence 
of the Anti-Federalists. A law-execution reading of “the executive 
power” better fits these data—as well as the variations in the 
Constitution’s three vesting clauses.  
Yet, a “thin” law-execution account of “the executive power” is 
possibly inconsistent with historical practice and Founding-era debates 
in both the domestic sphere and foreign affairs. If “the executive 
power” means only the power to carry into execution preexisting law 
and is entirely defeasible, then Congress can legislate on how the laws 
are to be executed in all possible detail. Congress could specify what 
officers shall prosecute offenses and enforce the laws, on what 
conditions they may be removed, and what the president’s role is with 
respect to these other officers. A thin law-execution reading of “the 
executive power,” in combination with the president’s foreign affairs-
related powers, may also be insufficient to explain the president’s 
power to instruct and recall ambassadors, as well as other presidential 
foreign affairs powers.  
Parts III and IV look to historical practice to put forward a new, 
“thick” law-execution account of “the executive power” vested in the 
president. This power is the power to execute law, but it includes within 
it certain incidental, derivative, or component powers that more easily 
explain much of the historical practice.  
 
 184. Professor Mortenson agrees with this assessment of the evidence: “The defining role of 
the legislature was promulgating law. The defining role of the judiciary was adjudicating law. And 
the defining role of the President was executing law.” Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra 
note 7 (manuscript at 42); see also id. (manuscript at 48) (“Eighteenth-century dictionaries, legal 
treatises, political theory tracts, caselaw, politicians, clergymen, and pamphleteers all agreed that 
the phrase ‘executive power’ meant something quite simple: ‘the power of putting in execution.’” 
(quoting Executive Power, A POCKET DICTIONARY (London, J. Newbery 3d ed. 1765))).  
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III.  DOMESTIC SEPARATION OF POWERS DISPUTES 
This Part examines a number of domestic separation of powers 
practices and debates from the Founding era onward to show they are 
consistent with a thick understanding of “the executive power” to 
execute law. Part III.A starts with appointments and removals, 
revisiting the famous “Decision of 1789” to show that a presidential 
removal power can be consistent with the law-execution reading of 
“the executive power.” Part III.B assesses presidential control over 
prosecution. Part III.C then examines the prerogative proclamation 
power and its implications for administrative regulations and the Steel 
Seizure Case. The real issue in that case was not whether the president 
had some “emergency” or “inherent” power to seize the steel mills; it 
was whether the president was properly exercising a “proclamation” 
power to help carry into execution existing laws or was engaging in new 
lawmaking. Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence was a distraction 
from the case’s true controversy. The upshot of this Part is that the 
president may have more indefeasible power in the domestic sphere as 
part of “the executive power” than proponents of the “thin” law-
execution or cross-reference readings have claimed. 
A. Appointments, Removals, and Presidential Administration  
It is best not to reinvent the wheel. Professor Mortenson himself 
agrees that “the executive power,” on the thin understanding of law 
execution, included the power to have “assistances.” “George Mason 
was in good company,” writes Mortenson, “in considering ‘the 
appointment of publick officers’ closely linked to the executive 
power—sometimes as a strict conceptual element of the thing itself, 
other times more loosely as an indispensable buttress for its meaningful 
exercise.”185 “This view of appointments as ‘executive’” even under the 
narrower reading “drew on a longstanding (though not uncontested) 
strand of Anglo-American legal thought.”186 Mortenson draws on 
sources from pre-revolutionary America: 
This view of the relationship between appointments and execution 
influenced thinking in the Americas well before the Founding. In a 
1771 Virginia dispute about appointments authority, for example, the 
 
 185. Id. (manuscript at 58) (footnote omitted) (quoting George Mason, George Mason’s 
Objections to the Constitution, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 287, 289 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986)). 
 186. Id. 
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winning counsel argued that “wherever an act of Parliament or of 
Assembly erects a new office, without prescribing the particular mode 
of appointing the officer, it belongs to the King to make the 
appointment.” Counsel’s explanation is key: the proposed canon of 
construction followed necessarily from the King’s executive power. 
“[P]ossessing the executive power of the laws,” it is the King’s 
“peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution, which cannot be 
unless an officer is appointed.” That in turn[] implied that “[i]f then 
our acts of Assembly, erecting [an office] have not said by whom the 
nomination shall be, it will follow that the King, who is to see the law 
executed, must nominate persons for that purpose.”187 
James Wilson adhered to this view in the Constitutional 
Convention, arguing that “[g]ood laws are of no effect without a good 
Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible 
appointment of officers to execute.”188 Mortenson concludes that 
although there were some objectors, “most Americans who spoke to 
the point seemed to conclude that the right to appoint ‘assistances’ in 
execution was necessary on any functional understanding of the power 
to execute.”189 Thus, Mortenson argues that when the term “executive 
powers” was used in the plural, it could have referred also to the 
component power to appoint officers for the purpose of assisting in law 
execution.190 
Although Mortenson does not discuss Blackstone in this regard, 
Blackstone’s chapter on the king’s powers and authorities is consistent 
with this view. Blackstone wrote that the king has “the right of erecting 
courts of judicature” because although “the constitution of the 
kingdom hath entrusted him with the whole executive power of the 
laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally 
carry into execution this great and extensive trust,” and thus it was 
“necessary, that courts should be erected, to assist him in executing this 
power.”191 Although Blackstone did not fully disentangle the executive 
and judicial powers here, he understood that the chief executive could 
 
 187. Id. at 59 (second alteration added) (quoting Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. Va. Rep. 96, 105 
(Gen. Ct. Va. 1771), reprinted in 1 VIRGINIA REPORTS, JEFFERSON—33 GRATTAN 52, 56–57 
(1903)).  
 188. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 538–39. 
 189. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 62).  
 190. Id. (manuscript at 66). Of course, as explained above, many state constitutions used the 
plural “executive powers” to describe other executive prerogatives, such as the pardon power. 
See supra Part I.A.2. 
 191. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 257. 
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not “personally carry into execution” “the executive power of the 
laws” and thus required other officers to “assist” in “executing this 
power.”  
Even so, some appointment power can be assigned away from the 
chief executive, as counsel in the 1771 case from Virginia noted.192 
Madison and Wilson generalized the point in the Constitutional 
Convention, arguing that the “extent of the Executive authority” was 
the “power to carry into effect[] the national laws” and “to appoint to 
offices in cases not otherwise provided for.”193 Ultimately, the 
Constitution requires senatorial advice and consent for all principal 
officers, and leaves it up to Congress to decide whether other officers 
should be appointed by that mode or by the president alone, the heads 
of departments, or the courts of law.194 Thus, the Constitution 
distributes some of this “executive power” to carry law into execution 
to both the Senate and Congress.195 Indeed, the president is left with no 
unilateral appointment power at all unless Congress chooses to 
redelegate that power for the appointment of inferior officers.  
The famous debate in the First Congress over the power to remove 
executive officers may now be put in a new light. The Constitution, as 
just noted, assigns part of the appointment power away from the 
president, but it does not say anything at all about removal. When the 
delegates were establishing the first departments of the national 
government, the question arose whether the departments’ principal 
officers had to be removed by the president with the advice and 
consent of the Senate; whether the Constitution vested that power in 
the president alone; or whether Congress in its discretion could 
 
 192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 193. See FARRAND, supra note 19, at 67 (reporting Wilson’s second of Madison’s proposal); 
id. at 70 (noting Wilson’s independent argument that “Extive. powers are designed for the 
execution of Laws, and appointing Officers not otherwise to be appointed”).  
 194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 195. This raises some interesting questions about whether Congress may circumscribe whom 
the president may appoint to certain positions or whether that power remains in the president. 
My initial thought is that the greater power to vest the power of appointment in the president 
alone, the heads of departments, or the courts of law includes a lesser power to specify the types 
of individuals who may be appointed—for example, those “learned in the law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 
505 (2018) (establishing the requirement for the solicitor general). This would not, however, apply 
to officers appointed by and with advice and consent (such as the solicitor general), and so the 
requirement of § 505 may be unconstitutional. The Senate could of course insist on any 
qualifications that it wanted. It is important to note that whatever the answer to this question is—
whatever “appointment power” is left to the president—that power would be the same under the 
residual vesting thesis as it would be under the reading of “the executive power” presented here.  
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delegate that power to the president alone.196 Madison first argued that 
“the executive power” was vested in the president, but that the 
Constitution had assigned some of that power to the Senate: 
The Constitution affirms, that the Executive power shall be vested in 
the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there 
are. The Constitution says, that in appointing to office, the Senate 
shall be associated with the President, unless in the case of inferior 
officers . . . . Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not.197 
Madison thus argued that all of “the executive power” not 
assigned away from the president belonged to the president. The 
question according to Madison, then, was: “Is the power of displacing, 
an Executive power? . . . [I]f any power whatsoever is in its nature 
Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling 
those who execute the laws.”198 “[I]f any thing in its nature is 
executive,” Madison added later on, “it must be that power which is 
employed in superintending and seeing that the laws are faithfully 
executed.”199 
Representative Fisher Ames agreed with Madison. “The 
Constitution places all Executive power in the hands of the President,” 
exhorted Ames, “and could he personally execute all the laws, there 
would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed 
powers of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others.”200 
Because the president cannot possibly handle all the minutiae of 
administration, he “must therefore have assistants.”201 “But in order 
that he may be responsible to his country,” Ames concluded, “he must 
have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them, with 
power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced 
their appointment cease to exist.”202 “The executive power” thus 
 
 196. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 381, 484 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Also, some 
representatives argued that impeachment was the only mode of removing officers—an argument 
that was not seriously advanced because, as Madison pointed out, impeachment is a method by 
which Congress can remove officers. It says nothing of the president’s power. Id. at 374–75.  
 197. Id. at 461, 463. As Madison said subsequently, “[T]he Executive power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States. The association of the Senate with the President in exercising 
that particular function, is an exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I 
conceive, are ever to be taken strictly.” Id. at 496. 
 198. Id. at 463. 
 199. Id. at 500. 
 200. Id. at 474. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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includes, according to Ames, a power for the president to remove his 
assistants. 
Madison’s and Ames’s arguments are consistent with the law-
execution view of “the executive power.” There is no indication in the 
debates that anyone in Congress understood them to be referring to 
the entire suite of royal authorities when they said “the executive 
power.”203 The discussion is entirely in the context of “appointing, 
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.”204 Their 
arguments are evidence that the Founding generation shared a “thick” 
view of “the executive power,” with which a presidential power to 
remove principal executive officers is consistent; a residual grant of 
executive powers is simply not necessary for the argument.205  
 
 203. As Professors Bradley and Flaherty note,  
Instead of seeing the Vesting Clause as conveying a package of foreign affairs powers, 
the House members who invoked the Clause may have simply believed that the Clause 
gave the President a general power to execute the laws, and that removal of 
subordinate executive officers was included within such a power. 
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 8, at 661.  
 204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 205. In a recent paper, Professor Daniel Birk argues on historical grounds that removal is not 
part of “the executive power” because the king did not in fact have an inherent removal power. 
Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428737 [https://perma.cc/
Q6YD-2MKX]. For a number of reasons, however, Professor Birk’s evidence does not contradict 
the account presented here. 
First, many of Professor Birk’s examples of non-removable principal officers are lifelong, 
hereditary officeholders from as early as the fourteenth century and running through the 
seventeenth century, when offices were considered to be personal property and where the 
granting of such tenures was entirely up to the king. See id. (manuscript at 21–25). But it is not at 
all clear that much of this survived into the late eighteenth century, and there is no reason to 
believe such examples provide any insight into the meaning of a constitution rooted in popular 
sovereignty. It is not particularly revealing that James I appointed Francis Bacon as his attorney 
general for life. Contra id. (manuscript at 22–23) (holding out Bacon’s tenure as “reveal[ing] an 
executive apparatus far removed in many respects from the assumptions of unity often projected 
onto it by modern scholars”). Moreover, Blackstone certainly argued that principal officers were 
entirely under the control of the king. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 327 (“[H]is majesty’s 
great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like[, 
are not] . . . in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws . . . .”). Nor does it 
matter that in these early centuries Parliament tried to regulate tenure to ameliorate the situation 
of hereditary and lifetime tenures. Contra Birk, supra (manuscript at 34–36) (emphasizing 
“Parliament’s longstanding desire to keep the king’s officers accountable”). Indeed, in the 
eighteenth century, most of Parliament’s relevant statutes converted life-tenured offices into 
offices removable at will. See id. (manuscript at 35).  
Second, many of the paper’s examples involve officers exercising judicial, ministerial, or 
municipal functions. See id. (manuscript at 25–28). But arguably none of these functions is, strictly 
speaking, part of “the executive power” to execute law. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 336 
(noting that coroners are not removable at the pleasure of the king and that they exercise “either 
judicial or ministerial; but principally judicial” power); id. at 328 (explaining that municipal 
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One implication of this argument is that even if “the executive 
power” is not a reference to the bundle of royal prerogatives, the scope 
of the president’s power to remove and direct administrative officials 
depends on whether one adopts Professor Mortenson’s thin law-
 
officials relate to “mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the 
domestic constitution of their respective franchises,” and therefore do not appear to exercise the 
national executive power); see also Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 W. 3 c. 2 (granting lifetime tenure 
to judges in Britain).  
Finally, there are a small handful of statutes that do create “commissioners” of various 
sorts, some of which contain for-cause removal provisions. See Birk, supra (manuscript at 32–34). 
However, these independent commissions appear to be exercising not executive power, but rather 
Parliament’s historic inquisitorial power. See, e.g., 2 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 69 (William Cobbett ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1807) (noting that in 1626 the House of 
Commons asserted that it was “the antient, constant, and undoubted right and usage of 
parliaments, to question and complain of all persons, of what degree soever, found grievous to 
the common-wealth, in abusing the power and trust committed to them by their sovereign”); 21 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 434–36 (William Cobbett ed., London, T.C. Hansard 
1814) (explaining that in a 1780 debate the Lord Chancellor stated that the matter of members of 
parliament receiving public contracts is subject to the “inquisitorial” power of Parliament). The 
statutes Professor Birk cites seem to fall within this power. They were enacted “[f]or better 
examining and auditing the publick accounts of this kingdom,” 25 Geo. 3 c. 52; “to examine, take, 
and state the publick accounts of the kingdom; and to report what balances are in the hands of 
accountants, . . . and what defects there are in the present mode of receiving, collecting, issuing, 
and accounting for publick money,” 20 Geo. 3 c. 54; 
to enquire into the fees, gratuities, perquisites, and emoluments, which are, or have 
been lately, received in the several publick offices therein mentioned; to examine into 
any abuses which may exist in the same; and to report such observations as shall occur 
to them, for the better conducting and managing the business transacted in the said 
offices, 
5 Geo. 3 c. 19; “to enquire into the losses and services of all such persons who have suffered in 
their rights, properties, and professions, during the late unhappy dissentions in America,” 26 Geo. 
3 c. 68; “to enquire into the losses of all such persons who have suffered in their properties, in 
consequence of the cession of the province of East Florida to the king of Spain,” 26 Geo. 3 c. 75; 
and “to enquire into the state and condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues, belonging 
to the crown,” 26 Geo. 3 c. 87. Indeed, it is unclear these commissions did anything but make 
recommendations, although the last of these commissioners were permitted to sell public lands. 
Id. And the commissioners were appointed by the legislature, not by the executive. See, e.g., id. 
In another paper, Professors Jane Manners and Lev Menand argue that offices with tenures 
for a term of years were historically understood not to permit removal until the term expired. 
Jane Manners & Lev Menand, Presidential Removal: Defining Inefficiency, Neglect of Duty, and 
Malfeasance in Office, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 27–42), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520377 [https://perma.cc/9ARG-FMMZ]. I agree with their statutory 
analysis, but it does not answer the constitutional question of whether such fixed terms without 
removal would be permissible for federal executive officers. Indeed, Manners and Menand 
explicitly avoid an in-depth analysis of the Executive Vesting Clause. Id. (manuscript at 18). 
Moreover, their own evidence suggests that a fixed term with no removal would have been 
understood to be unconstitutional: for the first one hundred years, Congress almost always added 
to statutory provisions providing for fixed terms the proviso, “unless sooner removed by the 
president.” See id. (manuscript at 35). The most natural implication is that Congress believed it 
had to do so as a constitutional matter.  
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execution reading, the cross-reference reading, or the thick reading 
presented here. Under the thin account, according to which “the 
executive power” is an entirely empty vessel, arguably Congress may 
freely limit the president’s removal and directory power.206 Under one 
version of the cross-reference theory, the Take Care Clause implies the 
necessary power for overseeing faithful execution. In this view, 
Congress’s power is limited somewhat, but it can at least establish for-
cause removal provisions. As a result, Congress can insulate 
subordinate officers from presidential direction so long as those 
officers are faithfully exercising any discretion within the bounds of the 
law.207  
In contrast, under the “thick” reading of “the executive power” 
presented here, the power to remove is part and parcel of the executive 
power itself. This means, first, that any discretion left within the bounds 
of the law is the president’s discretion. The president may therefore 
direct subordinate officers in the exercise of their discretion, even if a 
contrary decision by the subordinate would otherwise have been a 
faithful execution. And it means, second, that Congress cannot limit 
the presidential removal power, contrary to Professor McConnell’s 
view. According to McConnell, “the executive power” is entirely 
defeasible to the extent Congress has an enumerated power. And as 
part of the necessary and proper power to establish offices and 
assistants, Congress does have an enumerated power to condition the 
removal of executive officers. McConnell therefore argues instead for 
an indefeasible but more limited removal power on the basis of the 
Take Care Clause. He argues, along with Madison, that this clause 
implies that the president must have that species of power, namely 
removal, to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.208  
Under the account presented here, the content of the laws that the 
executive carries into execution are, of course, determined entirely by 
 
 206. Although Professor Mortenson has yet to articulate his views on the removal power, 
based on his paper and my discussions with him, my characterization is consistent with his 
account. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1269 (“[The Founding generation] 
would have understood the [executive] power as an empty vessel whose authority in any particular 
case depended entirely on the substantive decisions of the entity (sometimes the same one that 
held the power to execute) which possessed the legislative power to direct executive action.”).  
 207. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution 
and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2019) (“Our history supports readings of Article 
II . . . that limit Presidents to exercise their power in good faith . . . . So understood, Article II may 
thus place some limits on the pardon and removal authority.”). 
 208. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 201–05) ( “[T]he residual executive powers 
under the Vesting Clause are defeasible, not prerogative, powers.”). 
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some preexisting authority. The president cannot execute anything 
that is not already a law. But “the executive power” to carry these laws 
into execution, and all that this executive power entails—
appointments, removals, and, as we shall see presently, proclamations 
(executive orders)—is vested in the president. Congress cannot reduce 
this power because Congress and the Senate have only such powers 
over the component parts of “the executive power” as the Constitution 
itself distributes to them. Thus, these institutions have part of the 
appointment power but no other parts of “the executive power.” 
B. Prosecution  
The power to prosecute is not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution, and yet the executive has conducted prosecutions from 
the beginning of the Republic. The controversy over this power today 
involves whether Congress can create prosecutorial offices 
independent of the president. In 1978, Congress enacted the Ethics in 
Government Act, giving a special court the power to appoint, at the 
recommendation of the attorney general, an “independent counsel” to 
investigate high-level government misconduct.209 This independent 
counsel had the “full power and independent authority to exercise all 
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the 
Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or 
employee of the Department of Justice.”210 In other words, the counsel 
was a prosecutor, and was to be “independent” of the president—the 
president could not remove the counsel, and the attorney general could 
only remove her for good cause.211 
In Morrison v. Olson,212 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel in a 7–1 decision.213 Justice 
Scalia penned a lone dissent, famously writing: “Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of 
the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States.’ . . . [T]his does not mean some of the 
executive power, but all of the executive power.”214 Justice Scalia was 
surely—or at least mostly—right: the clause does vest all of “the 
 
 209. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601–602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–
74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–598 (2018)). 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a). 
 211. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–63 (1988).  
 212. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 213. Id. at 658, 696–97. 
 214. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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executive power” in the president, subject to the more specific 
appointment power exception. The question, however, is what 
constitutes this “executive power.” It may not include a residuum of 
prerogative powers—in fact, there is no evidence that Justice Scalia 
ever adopted such a reading of the clause215—but it might very well 
include the power to oversee all federal prosecutions.  
Indeed, the power over prosecution appears in Blackstone’s 
discussion of “the executive power of the laws.” Under a new roman 
numeral, Blackstone explained that “[a]nother capacity, in which the 
king is considered in domestic affairs, is as the fountain of justice and 
general conservator of the peace of the kingdom.”216 Under this 
heading, Blackstone described the king’s power to erect courts to assist 
in exercising “the whole executive power of the laws.”217 Blackstone 
then mentions criminal prosecutions. “In criminal proceedings, or 
prosecutions for offences,” it would be absurd for the king “personally” 
to sit in judgment because he is also the “prosecutor.”218 Because the 
public “has delegated all it’s power and rights, with regard to the 
execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate, all affronts to that 
power, and breaches of those rights, are immediately offences against 
him,” and the king “is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all 
public offences and breaches of the peace, being the person injured in 
the eye of the law.”219 This discussion suggests an explanation for why 
the executive has historically conducted prosecutions. It is not because 
prosecution is an unenumerated “executive” or “prerogative” power 
vested by virtue of a residual grant of power. It is because prosecution 
is part of “the executive power” to execute law.  
Thus, under the law-execution conception of “the executive 
power,” Congress may still be unable to divest the president of the 
 
 215. Justice Thomas adopted the residual vesting thesis in the Zivotofsky II passport case 
(more on that case in Part IV.B.6), but Justice Scalia did not. In responding to Justice Thomas’s 
argument, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The combination of (a) the concurrence’s assertion of broad, unenumerated “residual 
powers” in the President; (b) its parsimonious interpretation of Congress’s enumerated 
powers; and (c) its even more parsimonious interpretation of Congress’s authority to 
enact laws “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the President’s 
executive powers; produces (d) a presidency more reminiscent of George III than 
George Washington.  
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 84 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
 216. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 257. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 258 (emphasis omitted). 
 219. Id. at 258–59 (emphasis added). 
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prosecutorial power. Some scholars have claimed that “prosecution” 
was never an executive function, at least not one that had to be done 
by the president, and so Congress can limit the president’s control over 
prosecution. But these arguments are unpersuasive.  
In a prominent article, Professors Lawrence Lessig and Cass 
Sunstein argue that prosecution was considered “administrative,” as 
opposed to “executive,” and that the Framers therefore did not intend 
a unitary executive with control over prosecution.220 Lessig and 
Sunstein’s arguments, however, miss critical historical evidence. They 
first argue that federal district attorneys (now U.S. attorneys) did not 
report to any central authority.221 Yet even they recognize that 
presidents directed or countermanded these officers at least some of 
the time.222 But more importantly, the district attorneys did report to a 
central authority. Professors Lessig and Sunstein claim they did not 
because there was nothing like the Department of Justice in the early 
years of the Republic. “Until 1861,” they write, “these district attorneys 
did not report to the Attorney General, and were not in any clear way 
answerable to him,” and until 1820 the district attorneys reported to 
“no one.”223  
It turns out this assertion is likely incorrect. There was no 
Department of Justice, but the district attorneys did report directly to 
the secretary of state. The evidence for this is that when the chief clerk 
of the Department of State resigned in 1792, he left an account of the 
Department’s filing system, noting that “[t]he Consular returns are at 
the bottom of said desk right hand side; and so are the Letters from the 
Attornies of districts, which are tied together.”224 Thus, as historian 
 
 220. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 6 & n.14, 14–22.  
 221. Id. at 16–17, 76. 
 222. For example, they concede that “Jefferson at least exercised the directory power when 
he ordered district attorneys to cease prosecution under the Alien and Sedition Acts.” Id. at 18 
n.75. And, as Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash have pointed out, George 
Washington “‘instructed’ the attorney for the Pennsylvania district to nol-pros an indictment 
against the two individuals who had been accused of rioting,” and further directed the district 
attorneys to collect information regarding all infractions of the Neutrality Proclamation that came 
within their purview. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 659 (1994) (quoting 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 455 n.35 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)). 
 223. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 16. 
 224. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 503 
(1948).  
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Leonard White concluded, “The federal marshals and attorneys 
received their instructions from the Department of State.”225  
It may seem odd for the State Department to be involved in such 
matters, but it makes sense in light of the First Congress’s decision not 
to create a “home department.” Instead of the additional expense, the 
representatives thought it would be easy enough to assign the duties of 
a would-be home department to the already-existing executive 
departments. The home department would have had a principal officer, 
one of whose duties would have been “to see to the execution of the 
laws of the Union.”226 The officer would “do and attend to all such 
matters and things as he may be directed to do by the President.”227 
The motion to create such a department was defeated when several 
members objected that the secretary of foreign affairs—later the 
secretary of state—could attend to most of the duties proposed for the 
home secretary.228 
This is consistent with other historical evidence. White has 
observed that cases involving ships, such as prizes, privateers, and 
foreign vessels, were of “considerable importance” and “often came to 
the attention of the Secretary of State.”229 Cases involving the embargo 
of 1794 and the Nonintercourse Act of 1798 also “were such as to 
require direction from the State Department.”230 Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering actively instructed the district attorneys to 
prosecute cases under the Sedition Act of 1798.231 In another example, 
Pickering had to order the attorney in New York to release a British 
captain that had been arrested.232  
 
 225. Id. at 133. Of course, the presence of the correspondence alone does not establish the 
extent of the supervision; some interactions between the secretary of state and the federal 
attorneys appear to have been in the nature of requests. See id. at 408. Nevertheless, there was 
centralized supervision; and, as explained presently, on many occasions the president and 
secretary of state did in fact instruct the attorneys specifically.  
 226. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 666 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 667–68 (statements of Reps. Huntington and Sedgwick); id. at 669 (stating that the 
motion to establish “an Executive Department” was lost by “a considerable majority”). 
Interestingly, a few members argued that the duty of law execution was the judiciary’s. Id. at 667 
(statements of Reps. Benson and White). This seems clearly contrary to the Constitution’s 
injunction that the president shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  
 229. WHITE, supra note 224, at 407. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 407–08. 
 232. Id. at 485. 
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To be sure, White wrote, “[a]part from cases of exceptional 
importance and difficulty,” these attorneys “operated largely on their 
own responsibility.”233 That is, no doubt, because channels of 
communication were much slower in the 1790s, requiring this degree 
of independence. Yet when necessary the attorneys were centrally 
controlled by the executive branch. Although there is no clear evidence 
of any district attorney being removed, there is no indication that they 
could not be removed at will.  
Lessig and Sunstein next argue that the comptroller of the treasury 
was responsible for prosecuting revenue suits, and the comptroller’s 
decisions to prosecute were “relatively independent” and “outside the 
direct control of the President.”234 One of the two sources on which 
they rely, however, states only that the comptroller’s “decisions against 
claimants would be ‘final and conclusive.’”235 The question of 
conclusiveness had to do with whether the decisions of the comptroller 
would be subject to judicial review, and not whether the comptroller 
would be subject to the president’s directory and removal authority.236 
The other source indicates only that the Comptroller would make 
reports to Congress.237 Moreover, nothing in the statute withheld from 
the president the power to direct, control, or remove the comptroller.238 
Finally, Lessig and Sunstein argue that “federal officers were not 
the only ones who conducted federal prosecutions.”239 State officials, 
they write, “also conducted federal prosecutions, and these officers 
were clearly not subject to control by the President.”240 The only 
 
 233. Id. at 408. 
 234. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 17–18 (quoting DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH, THE 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 22 (1927)). 
 235. Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of 
Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74 (1983) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 48, § 4, 1 Stat. 
441, 442). 
 236. Whether an executive branch agency or official could act conclusively—or whether her 
acts would be judicially reviewable—had to do with the rights–privileges distinction in the 
nineteenth century. As Professor Caleb Nelson has written, “the public/private distinction had 
considerable resolving power; it formed the basis for a framework that was used throughout the 
nineteenth century to separate matters that required ‘judicial’ involvement from matters that the 
political branches could conclusively adjudicate on their own.” Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the 
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 564 (2007). Courts routinely determined whether 
agency determinations were “conclusive” as opposed to being subject to judicial review. Id. at 
577–82 (citing numerous cases). 
 237. SMITH, supra note 234, at 22.  
 238. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 222, at 653. 
 239. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 18. 
 240. Id. at 18–19. 
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statutory example cited by the authors for this proposition, however, is 
a single section of a single act respecting enemy aliens.241 This section 
merely granted jurisdiction to state courts to hear federal claims 
against such aliens by authorizing the “several courts of the United 
States, and of each state, having criminal jurisdiction,” as well as “the 
several judges and justices of the courts of the United States,” “upon 
complaint” against any such enemy alien, “to cause such alien or aliens 
to be duly apprehended and convened before such court, judge or 
justice.”242 The act went on to authorize the courts “after a full 
examination and hearing on such complaint, and sufficient cause 
therefor appearing,” to order the removal of the enemy alien from the 
United States.243  
There does not appear to be anything in this statute authorizing 
state officials to prosecute such federal actions in the state courts, 
although of course that does not disprove that they did so. Still, this 
particular statute does not establish a lack of presidential control, 
either. It merely authorized state courts to hear such actions, which is 
consistent with the Constitutional Convention’s famous “Madisonian 
Compromise,” by which Congress would have the choice not to create 
inferior federal courts and instead to rely on state courts to hear federal 
cases.244 Although this provision of the statute was not written with the 
utmost clarity, the margin description supports this interpretation: “All 
courts of criminal jurisdiction—and also the judges of the courts of the 
U. States may receive and hear complaints against alien enemies, and 
make an order thereon.”245  
 
 241. Id. at 19 n.76 (citing Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 577, 577). 
 242. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577. 
 243. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577–78.  
 244. This compromise, described in Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional 
Power To Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New 
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52–56 (1975), is enshrined in the text of Article III, which 
provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 245. § 2, 1 Stat. at 577. The secondary sources on which Lessig and Sunstein rely also point to 
this kind of evidence. Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 303 (1989) (“Congress vested jurisdiction in state 
courts over actions seeking penalties and forfeitures, granted concurrent jurisdiction to state 
courts over some criminal actions, and assigned state officials auxiliary law enforcement tasks.”); 
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 269–70 (Phila., Abraham Small 1822) (noting 
instances of concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction). That, again, is perfectly consistent 
with the Madisonian Compromise and does not bear on the question of the president’s Article II 
powers. As for the auxiliary tasks—including arresting fugitive slaves and deserting seamen—
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In a recent article arguing that prosecution was not necessarily 
“executive,” Professor Peter Shane suggests that prosecution was 
likely considered to be neither executive nor administrative but rather 
a “judicial” function.246 Yet Shane’s evidence is also subject to contrary 
interpretations. Shane states that the ratifiers in 1789 “would not have 
experienced . . . a widespread commitment to concentrated executive 
power.”247 Yet as Professor Mortenson demonstrates, the central thrust 
of the complaints against the Articles of Confederation was precisely 
that there was a complete lack of centralized execution—the 
confederation government had to rely upon the unreliable states for 
the execution of federal law.248 Shane also relies on state legislative 
appointments of states’ attorneys or attorneys general, or the vesting 
of the power to so appoint in courts;249 indeed, to this day Congress has 
vested in courts the power to appoint U.S. attorneys under certain 
conditions.250 But of course, as Mortenson himself recognizes and as 
explained above, “the executive power” was understood to be the 
power to carry the law into execution and to appoint assistants to do so 
where their appointments had not already been provided for by law.251 
 
these “cannot be characterized as prosecution,” although “they were certainly related to criminal 
law enforcement.” Krent, supra, at 305. To be sure, there is some evidence that the Founders 
expected Congress to have the power to commandeer state executive officers to enforce federal 
law. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 
1111 (2013) (“[F]ederal power to commandeer state officers was generally accepted at the 
Founding . . . .”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 
1960, 1990–2007 (1993) (“Though the Founding Generation did not wish to permit coercion of 
states in their sovereign, legislative capacities, many individuals envisioned federal 
commandeering of state executive officers.”). But even had they done so, it hardly follows that 
federal officials enforcing federal laws would not be removable by the president, in the same sense 
that state courts exercising general jurisdiction to hear federal cases need not have judges with 
the same salary and tenure protection as federal judges. 
 246. Peter M. Shane, Prosecutors at the Periphery, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 251–62 (2019).  
 247. Id. at 252. 
 248. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 14–27).  
 249. Shane, supra note 246, at 253, 256. 
 250. 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2018) (permitting a district court to appoint a U.S. attorney for its 
district upon expiry of a prior appointment by the attorney general).  
 251. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 52, 58–62); see supra 
notes 163–65, 193 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that relying on the fact of judicial 
appointments of attorneys general is anachronistic. The federal attorney general, for example, did 
not have control over prosecution until the late nineteenth century because the attorney general 
was simply the government’s lawyer, who represented the government in court. But the State 
Department did supervise prosecution. See supra notes 224–33 and accompanying text. The 
attorney general in the eighteenth century was a different kind of officer than in nineteenth 
century. This also explains why Professor Shane’s reliance on the lack of centralized law 
enforcement control may be misplaced. See Shane, supra note 246, at 255–57. Again, there was 
centralized control—just in the State Department.  
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And the Constitution explicitly contemplates “Courts of Law” 
appointing inferior officers at Congress’s discretion.252 
Perhaps more to the point, the Framers’ key source on executive 
power—Blackstone253—expressly disagrees with Shane’s proposition 
that prosecution was a judicial power. As noted above, Blackstone 
argued that the king could not “personally [sit] in judgment” precisely 
because he was the “prosecutor,” and he was prosecutor because the 
public “has delegated all it’s power and rights, with regard to the 
execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate.”254 One reason the king 
did not personally exercise the judicial power was because he exercised 
“the executive power” as the prosecutor in chief. 
In conclusion,255 Blackstone and Founding-era sources suggest 
that the power to prosecute offenses—and to appoint, instruct, and 
 
 252. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 253. See supra note 37 and Part II.A.  
 254. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 258–59 (emphasis omitted). 
 255. In addition to state officers purportedly exercising federal executive power, Lessig and 
Sunstein also pointed to qui tam actions by which a private individual could bring an action to 
enforce federal law. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 20. Calabresi and Prakash observe, 
however, that the British king historically had the power to pardon defendants in qui tam actions 
preemptively and thus that the executive still retained ultimate authority when private parties 
prosecuted the law. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 222, at 660–61. Shane also notes that 
prosecution was largely private. Shane, supra note 246, at 256–57. Regardless, qui tam actions are 
at most a vestigial component of the common law (and even of Roman criminal law) dating from 
a time long before kings exercised centralized authority and even longer before the development 
of separation of powers doctrine. Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 381, 385–86. As for private criminal prosecutions, a practice which existed in some 
American states in the nineteenth century, it appears that these were conducted in coordination 
with public prosecutorial officials. Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in 
the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 45–49 (1995).  
Other attempts to prove that prosecution was not executive similarly fall short. As I have 
written before, see Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 408 n.217 
(2017), Harold Krent has written an entire article critiquing the idea that criminal law 
enforcement is a core executive power, see Krent, supra note 245 passim. His critique, however, 
is unsatisfactory. To give only a few examples, Krent first argues that Congress has wide power 
to structure executive enforcement of the law. But his evidence is quite odd. He notes that “the 
Constitution assigns Congress the fundamental task of defining the content of criminal laws.” Id. 
at 282. But that is the legislative power and thus beside the point. He next suggests Congress has 
“authority to decide how the criminal laws are to be enforced” because it “may specify what 
penalties are to be assessed for various criminal violations, what law enforcement agencies have 
jurisdiction over particular criminal investigations, and what procedures the executive branch 
must follow in investigating crimes.” Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted). But deciding what the 
penalties for crimes shall be is also legislative. And it is well accepted that Congress may create 
inferior offices and departments to aid the president in execution of the laws—that says nothing 
of the president’s directive control over such inferior officers. He thirdly points to Congress’s 
power of appropriation as “a potent weapon with which to influence the Executive’s criminal law 
enforcement authority.” Id. at 284. Yet again that seems irrelevant. That Congress has the power 
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remove subordinate officers engaged in such prosecutions—is likely 
part of “the executive power” of the laws, even under the narrower 
understanding of the term.  
C. Proclamation Power 
The power to issue “proclamations” is another prerogative listed 
in Blackstone that has sometimes been described as “missing” from the 
Constitution.256 Yet this prerogative was also likely understood to be 
part of “the executive power” to carry law into execution. 
Understanding “the executive power” to include this proclamation 
power has significant implications both for modern administrative 
regulations and also for what is perhaps the most famous separation of 
powers dispute of all time—President Truman’s seizure of the steel 
mills. 
1. Blackstone.  Under the same roman numeral heading under 
which Blackstone described the king’s power to erect courts and 
prosecute crimes, Blackstone also described the power to issue 
proclamations. “From the same original, of the king’s being the 
fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing 
proclamations . . . . These proclamations have then a binding force, 
when . . . they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm.”257 
Lawmaking is the work of the legislative branch, “yet the manner, time, 
and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be 
left to the discretion of the executive magistrate.”258 Therefore, the 
king’s “proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they do not 
either contradict the old laws, or tend to establish new ones; but only 
enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being, in such 
manner as the king shall judge necessary.”259 Blackstone then added 
that the infamous Statute of Proclamations, by which it was enacted 
“that the king’s proclamations should have the force of acts of 
parliament[,] . . . was calculated to introduce the most despotic 
tyranny.”260 
 
of the purse and can influence the executive through use of that power says nothing at all about 
what is or is not executive power. 
 256. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 276–77 
(2009). 
 257. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 260–61. 
 258. Id. at 261 (emphasis added). 
 259. Id. (emphasis added). 
 260. Id. 
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Once again, then, Blackstone’s Commentaries reflect a thick 
version of “the executive power” whereby the president has the power 
to issue regulations and proclamations to help carry into execution the 
national laws. The proclamation prerogative is deduced from, and 
therefore included within, the greater prerogative to execute law. This 
has implications for administrative regulations and for the Steel Seizure 
Case, addressed below. It also suggests a previously unexplored 
argument in favor of the power to direct subordinate executive officers. 
James Madison and Fisher Ames assumed the directory power was 
part of “the executive power”; but Blackstone implied such a power 
too. For if the king’s proclamations were binding on the subjects, then 
surely they were also binding on a subset of those subjects, namely 
subordinate executive officers. If anyone had to abide by the king’s 
proclamations—“executive orders,” as they would be known today—it 
was those subjects serving as officers in his government.261  
2. Administrative Regulations.  Blackstone’s proclamation power 
may help clarify the role of modern administrative regulations under 
the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the president has a 
“specification power,” akin to Blackstone’s proclamation power, to 
make regulations to help fill gaps in statutes.262 This power is justified 
 
 261. Professor Peter Strauss argues that historically “the President could assure the faithful 
execution of the laws only through removal of one who failed to follow his directions, rather than 
substitution of his own decision.” See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? 
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705–06 (2007). Thus the 
president is an “overseer” and not a “decider.” Whatever the merits of that argument, the present 
argument, which does not depend on the president’s ability to execute the law personally, is not 
to the contrary. But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 701, 716–17 (arguing that the president must be able to execute the law personally). 
At a minimum, the president can instruct and direct officers and, if they disobey, remove them.  
What of the Opinions in Writing Clause? To be sure, that clause, purporting to authorize 
the president to seek the opinions in writing of the principal officers of the “executive” 
departments, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, may be superfluous under my reading of “the executive 
power,” see, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 32–38 (“No doubt, standing alone in the 
face of clear evidence that the framers were adopting the strong unitary conception, this clause 
would be a slender reed, and a redundancy.”). But there is at least an explanation for why the 
clause was included in the Constitution: it was a rejection of last-minute proposals to reintroduce 
a council of state and to allow the president to seek the opinions of the Chief Justice and the 
officers of Congress. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 335, 342–44, 367. With such a simple 
explanation at hand, the redundancy of the clause is far too thin a reed on which to rely to refute 
all the other evidence of the meaning of “the executive power.”  
 262. Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 695 (2020) [hereinafter 
Wurman, The Specification Power] (“This is the power to fill in the details where the statute is 
clear but does not specify the course of action.”). Because that piece details the specification 
power more fully, this Article does not discuss it in depth. 
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not only under a residual reading of the Executive Vesting Clause but 
also under the thick law-execution reading proposed here. Even if “the 
executive power” refers only to the power to carry law into execution, 
that power nevertheless includes as a necessary incident the derivative 
power to make regulations and proclamations—at least to the extent 
that such regulations do not “contradict the old laws, or tend to 
establish new ones.” Such a power, Blackstone wrote, can be 
“deduced” from the king’s executive power of the laws.263  
The question of defeasibility arises here, too. Just as with the 
power to carry laws into execution generally, the proclamation power 
is strictly subject to Congress’s laws; it can only be exercised in 
furtherance of those laws. And Congress can always obviate the need 
for a particular proclamation or regulation by legislating with more 
specificity. And perhaps Congress can empower subordinate executive 
officers only to execute the law in a certain way—for example, by 
engaging in adjudications and not rulemakings.264 But what Congress 
cannot do is prohibit the president of the United States from issuing 
proclamations—namely, executive orders—as part of the president’s 
efforts to carry Congress’s law into execution. That power is part of 
“the executive power,” not defeasible by statute.  
3. Youngstown.  The proclamation power casts the Steel Seizure 
Case in a new light. The debate was not over whether the president had 
“emergency” or “inherent” executive power to seize steel mills. The 
question was instead whether the president properly exercised the 
proclamation power to help carry existing national laws into execution 
or whether he slipped into new lawmaking. The debate, to take the 
words of Blackstone, was over whether President Truman’s executive 
order “enforce[d] the execution of such laws as are already in being,” 
or instead “contradict[ed] the old laws, or tend[ed] to establish new 
ones.”265 Properly understood, that is the exact debate that went on 
between the majority and dissent. 
 
 263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 264. This is standard administrative law doctrine: agencies have only those powers delegated 
by Congress, and they cannot issue rulemakings without authorization. See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum 
Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“The extent of [an agency’s] powers 
can be decided only by considering the powers Congress specifically granted it . . . .”).  
 265. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261. 
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The facts are familiar. The nation’s steelworkers were about to go 
on strike, but President Truman was prosecuting the Korean War.266 
For that, he needed steel.267 Truman therefore ordered his commerce 
secretary to seize and operate the steel mills.268 There was no statute 
prohibiting the president’s actions; however, Congress had explicitly 
provided for seizures in different circumstances, and had even 
considered and rejected providing such a power in the kind of 
circumstances at hand.269 The opinion is celebrated for Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence, in which he elaborated a tripartite framework 
for thinking about separation of powers concerns. In the first category, 
the president is merely executing Congress’s laws, and so presidential 
power is at its zenith.270 In the second category, Congress has been 
silent on the matter; here “there is a zone of twilight in which [the 
president] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain,” and “any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.”271 In the third category, 
Congress has expressly forbidden an action, and the president’s power 
depends on the president’s “constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”272 Jackson 
concluded that the Truman administration was effectively operating in 
the third category.273 
The best analysis, however, comes from the exchange between the 
majority and the dissent. Justice Black’s majority opinion argued that 
there are only two sources of presidential power: either a congressional 
 
 266. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 668, 672 
(1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 267. See, e.g., id. at 670. 
 268. Id. at 582–84 (majority opinion). 
 269. As the Youngstown majority explained,  
There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real 
property under certain conditions. However, the Government admits that these 
conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of the 
statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes 
(§ 201(b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome, involved, and 
time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”  
Id. at 585–86 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor 
disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional 
enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor 
disputes. 
 270. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 271. Id. at 637. 
 272. Id. at 637–38. 
 273. Id. at 640. 
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statute—such that the president is merely executing the law—or an 
independent constitutional provision.274 Justice Black agreed with 
Justice Jackson that there was no statute authorizing the president’s 
actions.275 The majority then discounted the commander-in-chief 
power because the United States itself was not a “theater of war.”276 
All that was left was “the executive power.” Justice Black explained, 
“Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several 
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a 
lawmaker.”277 By seizing the steel mills, the president was not 
purporting to execute the laws, but rather to make a new law.278 
The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson, did not argue that the 
president had “emergency power,” or some residual “executive” 
power of which seizing the steel mills was a part. Rather, they argued 
that to carry all of Congress’s laws into execution required seizing the 
steel mills until Congress could act. They observed that the Senate had 
ratified various defense treaties (including the U.N. Charter and 
NATO), and Congress had enacted defense and anti-inflationary 
legislation, including legislation granting the president power “to 
stabilize prices and wages and to provide for settlement of labor 
disputes arising in the defense program.”279 “The President has the duty 
to execute the foregoing legislative programs,” the dissenters 
concluded, and “[t]heir successful execution depends upon continued 
production of steel and stabilized prices for steel.”280 Vinson then 
surveyed dozens of examples through U.S. history of presidents 
exercising a kind of proclamation power to help carry law into 
execution in the absence of more specific directions from Congress.281 
 
 274. See id. at 585 (majority opinion).  
 275. Id. at 585–86. 
 276. Id. at 587. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 588 (“The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed 
in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner 
prescribed by the President.”). 
 279. Id. at 667–69, 671–72 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).  
 280. Id. at 672. 
 281. Id. at 683–700. For example, President John Adams had issued an arrest warrant 
pursuant to an extradition treaty, although Congress had not enacted legislation enforcing that 
treaty. Id. at 684. John Marshall, then a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, argued 
that “[t]he treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular object” and that the 
president may “perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not been 
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Put another way, Congress sometimes leaves out details necessary 
for implementing a law. Indeed, that is why the president must have a 
power to “specify” administratively certain details of implementation, 
so that the statute as a whole can be executed.282 This power that the 
executive had frequently exercised, in other words, was nothing other 
than the proclamation power described by Blackstone as the power 
over “the manner, time, and circumstances of putting . . . laws in 
execution.”283 
The question boiled down to a lower-order dispute: whether 
President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills was merely a “detail” of 
implementation specifying the “manner, time, and circumstances of 
putting” Congress’s legislative programs “in execution” in the absence 
of more specific direction from Congress. Chief Justice Vinson said yes; 
Justice Black said Truman was engaged in new lawmaking. Formulated 
thus, Youngstown is probably a harder case than is typically believed. 
Surely there was something to the dissent’s point that if steel 
production stopped, a whole set of congressional objectives would be 
compromised. On the other hand, the president can only execute the 
laws—and prosecute wars—with the tools, officers, and armies that 
Congress provides. Congress, after all, is given the power to raise fleets 
and armies, and to appropriate and provide for them.284 Seizing the 
steel mills seems like precisely an attempt to raise and provide for the 
army and navy, as Truman’s own executive order suggested.285 That 
seems like new lawmaking.  
Whatever the lower-order result, the debate in Youngstown 
between the majority and the dissent is consistent with a thick 
understanding of “the executive power” and does not require adopting 
a residual account of the Executive Vesting Clause. Moreover, it 
reveals that Justice Jackson’s concurrence was largely a distraction 
from the case’s true controversy.  
The above analyses suggest that many domestic separation of 
powers practices and disputes—appointments, removals, presidential 
direction, and Youngstown—can be better understood on a thick 
 
prescribed”; Congress could of course prescribe the mode of execution, but until it did so, “it 
seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.” 
Id. (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800)). 
 282. See Wurman, The Specification Power, supra note 262, at 712–13; supra Part III.C.2. 
 283. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261.  
 284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13. 
 285. Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 673–75 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Exec. Order 
10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952)).  
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conception of “the executive power” to carry law into execution. The 
upshot is that, at least in the domestic sphere, the president probably 
has more power than under a thin law-execution reading of Article II’s 
Vesting Clause. Although here, too, the president may sometimes have 
less power than the residual theorists claim.286 
IV.  THE EXECUTIVE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The account of “the executive power” proposed here is also 
consistent with a wide variety of presidential foreign affairs powers and 
activities, although it cannot justify everything presidents have done in 
this field. Still, a thick law-execution reading of “the executive power” 
explains better than any other available theory the validity of the 
Neutrality Proclamation, on what conditions the president may 
terminate treaties, the ability to instruct and recall ambassadors, and 
what presidential power there might be to recognize foreign 
governments. Although Professor Mortenson claims that the ability to 
torture terrorists marks a key difference between a law-execution and 
a residual vesting thesis of the Executive Vesting Clause,287 an 
indefeasible executive prerogative to torture terrorists is 
unsupportable on any account of the clause—whether it is the thin law-
execution version, the thick law-execution version, or the residual 
version. Under any of these readings, the executive might be able to 
torture terrorists as part of the commander-in-chief power if Congress 
has not legislated on the matter. Even that is questionable. Certainly 
there is no power under any of the accounts to torture in spite of what 
Congress has legislated.288  
Part IV.A briefly describes the five other available theories of 
presidential foreign affairs powers, including the residual vesting thesis 
and Mortenson’s thin law-execution theory. Part IV.B then analyzes 
the presidential powers and precedents described above to show how 
a thick understanding of “the executive power” to execute the law 
better explains most of these powers and precedents, although it 
 
 286. For example, this Article casts some doubt on In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which 
the Supreme Court held that the president had inherent power to assign a federal marshal to 
protect the life of Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Id. at 67. Perhaps a narrow “protective” 
power can be justified on the thick reading of the executive power proposed here, though I am 
somewhat skeptical. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing for a narrow but inherent power of the president “to protect and 
defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from harm”). 
 287. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3–4).  
 288. See infra Part IV.B.5. 
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cannot explain all assertions of presidential power (nor should it have 
to). Ultimately, the thick law-execution reading is the theory of best fit 
across the Constitution’s text, structure, intent, and historical practice. 
Further, some modern presidential practices and Supreme Court 
opinions in this area are probably unconstitutional or mistaken.  
A. The Standard Picture 
Professors Prakash and Ramsey, writing in 2001, describe three 
schools in the foreign affairs scholarship that can be labeled as 
“atextual.”289 These three schools respectively maintain that the 
president has primacy in foreign affairs, that Congress has primacy in 
foreign affairs, or that there is an indeterminate allocation of foreign 
affairs power in the Constitution.290 What these schools have in 
common, Prakash and Ramsey write, are that they have all “given up 
on the Constitution.”291  
The Supreme Court gave voice to the presidential primacy school 
in the famous Curtiss-Wright292 case, where the Court upheld a 
congressional delegation of power to the president to determine 
whether certain international arms sales should be prohibited.293 The 
Court noted “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for 
its exercise an act of Congress.”294 More recently, the modern Supreme 
Court gave voice to presidential primacy when it concluded that 
Congress, which otherwise legislates over passports, could not require 
that the country “Israel” be listed as the nation of birth at the request 
of someone born in Jerusalem.295 On the topic of which foreign nations 
to recognize, the Court held, “the Nation must ‘speak . . . with one 
voice’”—the President’s.296 The Court’s pronouncement in this case 
suggests that functional concerns—the nation must speak with one 
voice—take precedence over the constitutional text. 
 
 289. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 238 (“[T]hese camps have not articulated a 
complete or convincing theory, nor one soundly based on the Constitution’s text.”). 
 290. Id. at 238–43. 
 291. Id. at 233. 
 292. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 293. Id. at 331–33. 
 294. Id. at 320. 
 295. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 8–9, 31–32 (2015). 
 296. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 
(2003)). 
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The congressional primacy school correctly recognizes that 
Congress gets many foreign affairs powers. “[V]irtually every 
substantive constitutional power touching on foreign affairs is vested 
in Congress,” Professor John Hart Ely wrote, and therefore “[t]he 
Constitution gives the president no general right to make foreign 
policy.”297 Yet the Constitution gives some foreign affairs power to 
Congress and some to the president; the Constitution does not vest a 
“general” foreign affairs power in explicit terms in either branch.298  
Thus, Professor Edward Corwin argued that the federal 
government is vested with “unallocated” foreign affairs powers, 
leaving it up to Congress and the president “to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy.”299 And Professor Louis Henkin 
described the Constitution as a “laconic document” on foreign affairs, 
arguing that “[a]ttempts to build all the foreign affairs powers of the 
federal government with the few bricks provided by the Constitution 
have not been widely accepted.”300 
Prakash and Ramsey reject these three atextual views and root 
most presidential powers in a residual grant of executive and 
prerogative powers in the Executive Vesting Clause. “By the first 
sentence of Article II, ‘the executive Power shall be vested’ in the 
President. Executive power, as commonly understood in the 
eighteenth century, included foreign affairs powers.”301 This foreign 
affairs power “is residual, encompassing only those executive foreign 
affairs powers not allocated elsewhere by the Constitution’s text.”302 As 
Parts I and II argued, however, a residual vesting clause is implausible 
in light of the textual evidence, the proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention, and the silence of the ratification debates.  
Mortenson’s recent account is also textual: “the executive power” 
is the power to carry laws into execution. Mortenson’s account, 
however, might not be able to account for a variety of presidential 
 
 297. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 240 (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN HART 
ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 149 (1996)).  
 298. Id. at 245. 
 299. CORWIN, supra note 10, at 171–72 (arguing that foreign affairs powers are inherent in 
sovereignty, and that the president, Senate, and Congress vie for “the decisive and final voice in 
determining the course of the American nation”); see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 
242. 
 300. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13–15 (2d ed. 1996); 
see also Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 242. 
 301. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 252–53 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1). 
 302. Id. at 253 (emphasis omitted). 
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foreign affairs powers. “There is no question,” he writes, “that the 
Constitution’s terms are abstract and incomplete in most respects, and 
nowhere more so than the allocation of foreign affairs powers.”303 
Although he has yet to flesh out these arguments, he currently believes 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to fill 
in any foreign affairs gaps.304 Yet the Necessary and Proper Clause 
might not serve particularly well as a residual grant of foreign affairs 
powers because Congress can only carry into execution its own powers 
or those of the president, which leads us back to identifying which of 
the two departments has the relevant powers.  
Nonetheless, there is a plausible argument that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause could do the required work. Authorizing the president 
to enter into executive agreements or to terminate treaties, for 
example, could be convenient and useful to any number of 
congressional and presidential powers. But even so, the clause was 
historically understood only as a grant of implied powers and did not 
include “great substantive and independent power[s].”305 And the 
missing foreign affairs powers, like terminating treaties and entering 
into executive agreements, are arguably great, substantive, and 
independent powers. Additionally, even if the clause could do the 
required work, the historical record is potentially inconsistent: the 
congressional authorizations that would be required under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause for the exercise of certain presidential 
foreign affairs powers might be lacking.306 
 
 303. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1190.  
 304. Id. at 1270 n.440. 
 305. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) (stating that the 
incorporation of a bank “is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating 
commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to 
other powers, or used as a means of executing them” (emphasis added)); The Bank Bill, GAZETTE 
U.S. (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372, 378–79 (Charles 
F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) (reporting Madison’s speech to Congress, in which 
he opposed the incorporation of a national bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an 
exercise of a “particularly . . . great and important power,” and noted that incorporating a bank 
“was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative”); cf. GARY LAWSON, 
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 60–62, 83, 117–19 (2010) (arguing that similar antecedent 
clauses had been grants of implied and incidental, and not great and important, powers). 
 306. Congress does typically grant authority to the president to create executive agreements, 
see Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 
YALE L.J. 140, 144–45 (2009), but as far as I am aware it has not authorized unilateral treaty 
terminations. 
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None of the accounts, in other words, fits all the data. The three 
atextual views largely ignore the constitutional text altogether. The 
residual vesting thesis is not plausible in light of the text and structure, 
the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention, and Ratification. 
Mortenson’s thin law-execution reading relies heavily on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, which may be unable to do all of the required work.  
The thick law-execution account of “the executive power” has the 
most explanatory power. Without relying on a residual grant of power 
or the Necessary and Proper Clause, it can explain important 
presidential powers and episodes, including the Neutrality 
Proclamation, terminating certain treaties, and instructing and 
recalling ambassadors. But it also suggests that certain recently claimed 
presidential powers—the powers to set foreign policy, exclusively to 
recognize foreign governments, to torture terrorists, to enter into 
executive agreements, and to terminate any treaty unilaterally—are 
likely unsupportable. Under the thick law-execution account, the 
president probably has fewer foreign affairs powers than some 
proponents of the residual vesting thesis suggest. As compared to the 
thin law-execution account, the president’s foreign affairs powers are 
similar, although the power to instruct and recall ambassadors, which 
depends on the president’s appointment and removal authority, are 
more robust under the thick than the thin account.  
B. Revisiting Presidential Powers 
1. Neutrality and “Setting” Foreign Policy.  The Neutrality 
Proclamation is the most important of the early foreign policy 
precedents. Britain and France were at war, and the question was 
whether the United States was obligated to enter the war on the side 
of France, with whom the United States had been allied since the 
Revolutionary War.307 The only problem was that the monarch with 
whom the relevant treaty was signed had just been executed during the 
French Revolution, and so there had been a radical change in 
government.308 And the alliance was a defensive one only, and arguably 
France had begun the conflict with Britain.309 Under the circumstances, 
what were the United States’ obligations?  
 
 307. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 332. 
 308. R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 105 n.185 (1974) 
(“Hamilton argued that the treaty was void because of the radical change in the government of 
France since its ratification . . . .”). 
 309. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 442 (2004). 
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President Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality.310 
Prakash and Ramsey argue that in so doing, “Washington confirmed 
that as part of the executive power over foreign affairs, the President 
unilaterally could announce the foreign policy of the United States.”311 
This power to “set foreign policy,” they claim, is a “key foreign affairs 
power[] that . . . cannot be encompassed by an ordinary reading of the 
specific provisions of the Constitution.”312 
Yet Washington’s action is explicable under the thick 
understanding of “the executive power” to carry into execution the 
national laws, which include treaties.313 As part of this executive power 
to execute treaties, Washington could exercise the very proclamation 
power described by Blackstone: he could establish “the manner, time, 
and circumstances of putting those laws in execution” by 
“proclamations” that “only enforce[d] the execution of such laws as are 
already in being.”314 
That is exactly how Hamilton initially defended the proclamation 
in his debate with Madison. Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton wrote that 
the legislative department “is charged neither with making nor 
interpreting Treaties” nor “with enforcing the execution and 
observance of these obligations and those duties” involving treaties 
and foreign powers.315 Although the judiciary “is indeed charged with 
the interpretation of treaties[,] . . . it exercises this function only in the 
litigated cases; that is where contending parties bring before it a 
specific controversy.”316 Turning to the executive, he continued, “It 
must then of necessity belong to the Executive Department to exercise 
the function in Question,” as 
[i]t appears to be connected with that department in various 
capacities, as the organ of intercourse between the Nation and 
foreign Nations—as the interpreter of the National Treaties in those 
cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the cases 
 
 310. George Washington, Neutrality Proclamation (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 472, 472–73 (Philander D. Chase ed., 
2005). 
 311. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 297. 
 312. Id. at 258. 
 313. The “supreme Law of the Land” includes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 314. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 261. 
 315. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 11. 
 316. Id.  
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between Government and Government—as that Power, which is 
charged with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a 
part—as that Power which is charged with the command and 
application of the Public Force.317 
Or, as he wrote toward the end of the essay, “The President is the 
constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our Treaties and the laws of 
Nations form a part of the law of the land. He who is to execute the 
laws must first judge for himself of their meaning.”318  
Hamilton thus argued that the chief executive is the “interpreter 
of the National Treaties” in cases not judicial in nature, and “is charged 
with the Execution of the Laws, of which Treaties form a part.”319 
Washington, in other words, was merely exercising “the executive 
power” of the laws, which includes a proclamation power, as applied to 
treaties. It is true that Hamilton went on to make the case for a kind of 
residual grant of executive powers, and assumed that foreign affairs 
related powers were “executive” in this sense.320 Yet this second 
argument was unnecessary. The neutrality proclamation can easily be 
explained under the thick version of “the executive power.”  
What to make of the claim that the neutrality proclamation is an 
example of President Washington “setting” the foreign policy of the 
United States and the claim of many scholars that presidents routinely 
set foreign policy?321 Where does the president get such a power? 
The question seems largely beside the point. Even Prakash and 
Ramsey recognize that when presidents “set” foreign policy, their 
“policy” is nonbinding.322 The Monroe Doctrine is a classic example. 
President Monroe declared it to be the policy of the United States to 
oppose any European intervention in the Americas.323 Yet the very fact 
that this doctrine was nonbinding suggests that it was not an exercise 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 16. 
 319. Id. at 11. 
 320. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 321. See, e.g., GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER 45, 63 (1997); Prakash & Ramsey, 
supra note 9, at 237, 327; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 212–15 (1998); John Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1935, 1988 (2009) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)). 
 322. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 262–63, 263 n.122. 
 323. Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823) (James Monroe), in 2 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 207, 209, 218 
(James D. Richardson ed., Washington, Gov’t Pub. Off. 1896). For a summary by the state 
department historian, see VINCENT, supra note 308, at 107–13. 
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of any constitutional power. After all, President Monroe could not 
unilaterally enforce such a doctrine. He could not declare war on his 
own if a European nation ignored his threats. He could not repeal 
existing commercial regulations or impose new ones without new 
congressional laws. In other words, the president may declare a view of 
foreign policy, but whether the president has the constitutional powers 
to make good on that view is an entirely separate matter.  
This suggests that Congress could declare foreign policy for its 
purposes, too. Anyone can speak. The House passed a resolution in 
support of the French Constitution of 1792 and the French adoption of 
a new flag four years later.324 U.S. Senator Tom Cotton, in 2015, 
addressed a letter to the Iranian government explaining his view of the 
relevant relations between Iran and the United States.325 None of these 
instances seems to be an exercise of constitutional power. Whether any 
of these actors—the president, the House of Representatives, or a 
single U.S. Senator—has any power to make good on what they say is 
a matter of constitutional power.  
2. Terminating Treaties.  The Neutrality Proclamation also sheds 
light on another issue of presidential power—the ability to terminate 
treaties. Prakash and Ramsey argue that under the U.S. Constitution, 
“the question is which branch has the power to make the requisite 
determinations and to direct the delivery of the appropriate notice” to 
terminate a treaty.326 Although this question has greatly troubled 
foreign affairs scholarship, they write, the residual vesting thesis “yields 
a clear answer. Terminating a treaty in accordance with its express 
terms or with international law is a power not mentioned directly in the 
Constitution, but was obviously part of the traditional executive’s 
foreign affairs power.”327 
 
 324. The episodes are described in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: 
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 175–76, 175 n.17 (1997). To be sure, Washington asked 
that both resolutions be delivered through him. Id. But it is hardly clear that this was 
constitutionally necessary. Jefferson argued that the House “had a right, independently of 
legislation, to express sentiments on other subjects,” though they should communicate to foreign 
powers through the president. Id. (quoting The Anas (recording Jefferson’s notes from March 12, 
1792), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 87, 111 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, 
Taylor & Maury 1854)).  
 325. Press Release, Tom Cotton, Sen. from Arkansas, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send 
Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=120 [https://perma.cc/S66Q-BZ7G]. 
 326. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 265. 
 327. Id. 
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Once again, though, a thick understanding of “the executive 
power” better explains the legal framework. Washington’s neutrality 
proclamation effectively declared the previous treaty of alliance with 
France terminated because of the radically different French 
government then existing. Obviously, if conditions have occurred that 
require the termination of a treaty or a finding that the treaty has 
already been terminated by the other sovereign, then the president 
cannot execute that treaty as though it were still in force and at the 
same time be “faithfully” executing the law. To execute the treaties, 
the president has to decide whether they are still in force. A residual 
vesting of all royal prerogative powers is not necessary to obtain this 
result. 
To be sure, this discussion does not answer the question of how to 
terminate treaties that do not specify conditions by which they may be 
considered terminated. Prakash and Ramsey do not have an answer to 
that problem. They recognize a tension between the argument that the 
power to terminate “plainly” belonged to the monarch and the fact that 
treaties are the supreme law of the land.328 A thick understanding of 
“the executive power” resolves at least a part of this tension. The 
president must faithfully execute a treaty that is still in force. In so 
doing, the president may determine if the treaty is no longer in force 
but may not decide whether it should not be in force. Other grants of 
power in the Constitution better account for treaty termination when 
the treaty does not specify the conditions of termination. For example, 
if a treaty is not self-executing, then it seems up to Congress (with the 
president’s signature) to repeal implementing legislation.329  
If, however, the treaty is both self-executing and omits the 
conditions by which it can be declared terminated, then it seems that 
just as any other law has to be repealed, the treaty would have to be 
repealed by the same authority that made it—at a minimum the Senate 
and the president together, or Congress as a whole and the president. 
This appears to have been the early practice and understanding.330 
 
 328. Id. at 265 n.135. Thus, they conclude that “[i]t is not clear what effect the combination of 
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI and the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 2 would have 
on this analysis,” and they leave the problem for another day. Id. 
 329. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 695, 695 (1995) (describing the difference between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties). 
 330. See J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46, 48–55 
(1978) (arguing that the historical tradition of shared responsibility for abrogation of treaties has 
eroded). 
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Prakash and Ramsey claim the power to terminate treaties “was 
obviously part of the traditional executive’s foreign affairs power,”331 
but their support for this claim is not clear. Insofar as the British 
monarch had such a power, that could be because the monarch had the 
power to make the treaties and, as explained, it was understood that 
the power to make a treaty included the power to terminate it. Of 
course, whether or not the early understanding was a correct 
understanding of the constitutional text is somewhat beside the point, 
which is that wherever this termination power came from, it is not clear 
that anyone thought it derived from “the executive power.” 
At a minimum, the thick understanding of “the executive power” 
provides clear answers some of the time. The president may determine 
that the conditions leading to termination have been met as part of “the 
executive power” to interpret and carry into execution those treaties 
that specify such conditions. For a non-self-executing treaty without 
such conditions, it seems left to Congress and the president, through 
the enactment of legislation, to decide whether or not to implement the 
treaty. And although this Article cannot give a definitive answer to 
self-executing treaties without conditions of termination, it at least 
appears that members of the Founding generation understood the 
power to terminate a treaty to be included within the power to make 
it. Whether or not this historical understanding is ultimately correct as 
a matter of the Constitution’s text, certainly no one appears to have 
thought that the right to terminate was part of “the executive power.” 
3. Instructing and Recalling Ambassadors.  Instructing and 
recalling ambassadors are two other presidential powers that Prakash 
and Ramsey claim are inexplicable on the basis of the constitutional 
text absent the residual vesting thesis.332 The only remotely applicable 
textual grant, they argue, is the power to appoint (by and with advice 
and consent of the Senate) ambassadors; but this “surely cannot convey 
to the President alone the power to recall them.”333 Ambassadors are 
not analogous to other executive officers unless one thinks that the 
president must carry into execution the power over foreign affairs. 
This, they argue, assumes the very point that is to be demonstrated.334 
 
 331. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 9, at 265. 
 332. Id. at 244. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 244–45.  
WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  3:13 PM 
2020] IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE 169 
But that is a very cramped view of the textual grants of presidential 
power. The answer seems more straightforward: the president has the 
power to make treaties and present them to the Senate for advice and 
consent. The Constitution itself, in other words, tasks the president 
with a particular trust—the trust of negotiating and securing treaties. 
The “executive power of the laws” that belongs to the president 
extends to the power to execute this trust. Just as with the removal of 
domestic executive officers, the president cannot possibly hope to 
execute this trust alone and must therefore rely on assistants. The 
president may therefore appoint, direct, and remove them as part of 
this executive power, subject to any constitutional provisions assigning 
such powers away. The only provision to do so gives the Senate a role 
in confirming appointments.  
To be sure, ambassadors do more than just negotiate treaties on 
behalf of the president. They also gather information incident to such 
negotiations and help to ensure the foreign power properly executes 
the treaty. These tasks, too, are part of “the executive power” to carry 
into execution existing treaties or to carry into execution the 
constitutional trust to make treaties. Ambassadors also maintain 
friendly relations; but that could also be considered as part of “the 
executive power” to ensure existing treaties are honored. Even if 
ambassadors do other things that cannot be explained as part of the 
power to make treaties or carry existing treaties into execution, surely 
they exercise enough of the president’s “executive power of the laws” 
that they are subject to recall and instruction.  
Indeed, as explained above, the delegates in the Constitutional 
Convention certainly did not think a general foreign affairs power—
presumably including the power to recall and instruct ambassadors—
was missing. Charles Pinckney observed that “the Senate is to have the 
power of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs,” although the 
Senate at that point had little more than the treaty and appointment 
powers.335 And the power to make treaties may have included the 
power to “treat” with foreign nations generally.336 Blackstone, 
moreover, argued that the king was the depository of the nation’s 
foreign affairs powers, but he only listed the prerogatives that also 
found their way into the U.S. Constitution.337  
 
 335. 2 FARRAND, supra note 19, at 183–84, 235 (emphasis added).  
 336. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra Parts I.B, II.A. 
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There are other arguments to which one can resort without a 
residual grant of foreign affairs powers. As Hamilton wrote in his 
Pacificus essays, if it was up to Congress to declare war, was it not up 
to the president to “execute” the existing conditions of peace, until war 
could be declared?338 Although surely not decisive, it is notable that the 
key debates over the removal power in 1789 revolved around the 
secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs.339 Presumably this 
secretary had little to do with the “execution” of domestic laws.340 The 
secretary was to be responsible for ambassadors and their duties.341 Yet 
the First Congress obviously saw no distinction between this principal 
officer and the principal officers of the other executive departments. 
There is, however, one important document involving managing 
ambassadors, and managing foreign affairs generally, that may be 
taken as evidence of the residual vesting thesis. In 1790, Thomas 
Jefferson wrote an opinion for President Washington addressing 
whether the Senate could negative the grade of the ambassador that 
the president recommends along with the appointment. Jefferson 
answered in the negative, writing that the Constitution “has declared 
that ‘the Executive powers shall be vested in the President,’ submitting 
only special articles of it to a negative by the Senate,” and that “[t]he 
transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether” 
and therefore “belongs then to the head of that department, except as 
to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate.”342 
At first blush, this letter does seem to support the residual vesting 
reading of the clause; and if Jefferson and Hamilton are in rare 
agreement, that would make this reading all the more persuasive. It is 
possible, however, to read Jefferson’s letter consistently with 
Madison’s view in the removal debates of 1789. True, Jefferson says 
that the transaction of business with foreign nations is “Executive,” and 
 
 338. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 13 (“If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one 
hand—it is on the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared.”). 
 339. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); supra Part III.A. 
 340. Though, as explained, this officer did eventually become responsible for some duties that 
would have been assigned to a home office had such an office been established, including 
overseeing district attorneys. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.  
 341. The statute required the secretary to execute such duties delegated by the president 
“relative to correspondences, commissions or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls, 
from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or 
to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such 
other matters respecting foreign affairs.” Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28, 29.  
 342. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic 
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 158, at 109–10.  
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the subsequent reference to exceptions seems to suggest that Jefferson 
views foreign affairs within the grant of power in the Executive Vesting 
Clause. But note that Jefferson actually misquotes the clause, writing 
that it vests “the Executive powers,” in the plural, in the president. Of 
course, that is not what the clause actually does.  
Recall also, yet again, that the Convention likely understood that 
the Senate would have the management of foreign affairs when the 
Senate had the treaty and appointment powers. It could be, then, that 
the president has the management of foreign affairs because of these 
two powers, not because of the Executive Vesting Clause. Indeed, 
Jefferson’s whole letter is addressing the scope of the Senate’s 
appointment power—he is addressing whether the Senate’s 
appointment power allows them to negative the grade of the 
ambassador or simply to negative the nominee. As previously 
explained, the appointment power is part of “the executive power,” 
because the president cannot execute the law—and cannot conduct 
foreign affairs—alone. In short, Jefferson’s letter is some evidence in 
favor of the residual vesting thesis, but the matter is not entirely clear.  
4. Recognition.  The president’s power to recognize foreign 
governments has been a matter of constitutional litigation in recent 
years.343 What constitutional actor has the power to recognize foreign 
governments hardly depends on a residual grant of “the executive 
power.” The president has the duty to receive ambassadors, and as 
Hamilton wrote, this right “includes that of judging, in the case of a 
Revolution of Government in a foreign Country, whether the new 
rulers are competent organs of the National Will and ought to ⟨be⟩ 
recognised or not.”344 Thus, there is an explicit textual hook for the 
president’s recognition power on some occasions—at least when 
foreign ambassadors present their credentials. That hardly means 
Congress has no power to recognize foreign governments. Congress 
can establish offices, including ambassadorships; it can choose which 
such offices to establish and in what countries. And Congress can 
regulate foreign trade and thereby implicitly recognize a foreign 
government.  
The dispute over recognition in modern times has been more 
specifically over whether that power is exclusively presidential; in 
 
 343. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1, 12–14 (2015). 
 344. PACIFICUS, supra note 68, at 14. 
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Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),345 the Supreme 
Court said yes, but relied on functional considerations.346 It had to rely 
on such considerations because the Court’s conclusion is indefensible 
on any account of the text. Even an indefeasible grant of residual 
power to the president does not include any prerogative powers 
granted to Congress. On any account of the text, it is hard to see how 
the recognition power is exclusive.  
5. Torturing Terrorists.  The same short analysis solves the riddle 
of “torturing terrorists.” Even under an indefeasible residual grant of 
power, the president only has such powers not granted to Congress. 
Yet, as Professor McConnell explains, Congress has the prerogative 
power to make rules and regulations for the armed forces.347 It is clearly 
within Congress’s power, in other words, to prohibit torture. The only 
situation in which the president might be able to authorize torture is if 
Congress has not legislated on the matter, and the torture occurred in 
an actual field of battle while the president was acting as commander 
in chief. But even if the president could authorize torture under such 
circumstances, that result would not depend on any residual grant of 
prerogative power; it would depend on one’s interpretation of the 
commander-in-chief power.  
6. Executive Agreements.  In addition to calling into question 
claims of a unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties, the thick 
law-execution account calls into question the validity of executive 
agreements: those non-treaty agreements entered into between the 
president and the head of a foreign nation. If entering into “executive 
agreements” without Senate ratification is an executive (prerogative) 
foreign affairs power, then it would certainly belong to the president 
 
 345. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1 (2015). 
 346. According to the Court, 
Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must “speak . . . with one voice.” That 
voice must be the President’s. Between the two political branches, only the Executive 
has the characteristic of unity at all times. And with unity comes the ability to exercise, 
to a greater degree, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The President is 
capable, in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic 
contacts that may lead to a decision on recognition. He is also better positioned to take 
the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize other states at international 
law. 
Id. at 14–15 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003); then quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 74, at 
423–24 (Alexander Hamilton)).  
 347. MCCONNELL, supra note 6 (manuscript at 225). 
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under a residual grant of power; there is no other constitutional text on 
point. But must the theory of “the executive power” square with the 
existence of executive agreements? It seems much more plausible that 
at least some of these agreements—innovations of the late nineteenth 
century, and even then they were mostly aberrations until the mid-
twentieth century348—are unconstitutional. We should not worry about 
making a theory of “the executive power,” as it was understood in the 
late eighteenth century, fit with novel practices of the late nineteenth.  
In any event, some binding executive agreements might be 
constitutionally justified as permissible delegations of legislative 
authority from Congress to the executive.349 And non-binding 
executive agreements can be considered in the same terms as “setting” 
foreign policy—any president may speak. Whether there is any 
constitutional power to back it up is then entirely a matter of 
independent constitutional power or statutory authorizations from 
Congress. Regardless, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Curtiss-
Wright case to the effect that the powers of “external sovereignty” must 
exist somewhere350—and therefore, for example, perhaps a power to 
make executive agreements need not depend on specific affirmative 
grants of power in the Constitution—is dubious.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested an interpretation of “the executive 
power” that fits constitutional text, structure, intent, and historical 
practice better than any competing theory. It is the only theory that fits 
the variety of textual evidence for the proposition that “the executive 
power” was the power to execute law, that fits the instruction of the 
delegates in the Constitutional Convention and the silence of 
opponents during ratification, that makes sense in light of the 
delegates’ likely views on the power to erect corporations and over 
immigration, that makes the three vesting clauses cohere, and that fits 
most prior practice in the domestic front and in foreign affairs.  
It is sometimes said today that an originalist interpretation of the 
Constitution would lead to a president who is “above the law.”351 But 
 
 348. See Hathaway, supra note 306, at 144–45. 
 349. As Professor Oona Hathaway has detailed, most executive agreements are in fact made 
pursuant to congressional delegations of authority. Id. at 144–46. 
 350. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1936). 
 351. See, e.g., Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 7, at 1175 (suggesting the 
consequences of the residual vesting thesis and asking, “Surely the President isn’t above the 
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under the interpretation presented here, the president is by no means 
above the law. To be sure, under this account, the president has more 
indefeasible power on the domestic front than on a thin law-execution 
account of “the executive power.” And in foreign affairs, many 
presidential powers can in fact be explained by the thick law-execution 
reading of “the executive power,” although not all of them. But the 
executive that emerges from this analysis is largely subservient to 
Congress on matters both foreign and domestic, albeit with ample 
powers to carry Congress’s laws into effect, as the executive sees fit, 
within the confines established by those laws. 
 
 
law?”); see also David E. Graham, The Dual U.S. Standard for the Treatment and Interrogation of 
Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 325, 326 n.2 (2009) (“The ‘Commander-
Above-the-Law’ is a term sometimes used to depict the current Administration’s interpretation 
and implementation of the unitary executive concept.” (citing JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE 
LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR 89–91 
(2007))). 
